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I. THE JuDICIAL SAFEGUARDS OF NATIONALISM AND THE POLITICAL
SAFEGUARDS OF FEDERALISM
What does federalism have to do with the question of what role "foreign"
law does or ought to play in the United States? That issue frames this Article.
In the United States, a movement that I call exclusive sovereigntism seeks
to buffer the United States from "foreign" influences. That approach takes
shape through various efforts; the two in focus here are attempts to limit
judicial reliance on "foreign" law in constitutional interpretation1 and to
constrain localities from aligning themselves with transnational efforts on
human rights and global warming. Just as the expressions of exclusive
sovereigntism are diverse, so are the political propositions that support it.2 The
facet explored here is the sovereigntist claim that the democratic structure of
American federalism makes the tum to "foreign" law especially problematic.
State autonomy and democracy are proffered as reasons to hold comparative
and internationalist forays by judges and local officials at bay.
I appreciate and share sovereigntists' focus on law, its sources, and its
speakers as important parts of the identity-building activity of nation-states. 3
The acts of pronouncing, reiterating, implementing, and internalizing legal
obligations are ways in which to make certain rules and practices constituent of
community membership. Moreover, given that judges are specially situated
legal actors, the attention paid to their words is appropriate. Through the
vividness of conflicts over specific cases, judges become highly visible
speakers asserting the meaning of a nation's law.
lOne example of this position, discussed infra Part IlI.B, is a statute proposing to prohibit judges from
relying on the law of "any foreign state or international organization or agency, other than English
constitutional and common law up to the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United States" when
interpreting or applying the Constitution of the United States. See Constitutional Restoration Act of 2005, S.
520, l09th Congo (2005).
2 See Judith Resnik, Law as Affiliation: "Foreign" Law, Democratic Federalism, and the Sovereigntism
of the Nation-State, 6 INT'LJ. CONST. L. (I-CON) (forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Resnik, Law as Affiliation].
Further, as I detail there, sovereigntism can be inclusive as well, in that a country's national identity could be
tied to its relationships and connections to other legal regimes. See id. South Africa's Constitution, discussed
infra note 14, provides such an example.
3 See Resnik, Law as Affiliation, supra note 2; Judith Resnik, living Their Legal Commitments: Paideic
Communities, Courts, and Robert Cover, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 17 (2005); see also Susan S. Silbey, Talk of
Law: Contested and Conventional Legality, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 639, 643 (2007) (analyzing "the variety of
ways in which legality and the rule of law are performed in American culture, and the difference between
contested, ideological law and conventional, hegemonic law").
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But to the extent that sovereigntists argue that their aims are to protect the
democratic predicates of United States law and the authority of states, they
miss how important state and local political leaders are in welcoming insights
from abroad and in shaping American law. When articulating domestic
policies, mayors, governors, and members of state and city legislatures often
look beyond their own borders for guidance and sometimes choose to affiliate
their localities with transnational initiatives.4 Through such decisions,
American federalism has served as a major route through which "foreign" law
becomes domesticated.
These local leaders often do not act alone. Underappreciated thus far in the
literatures on federalism and on social network theory is the role played by
translocal organizations of public officials. These networks (such as the
Conference of Mayors, the National League of Cities, the National Governors
Association, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the National
Association of Counties, and others) are national, but not federal. They both
mirror the jurisdictional boundaries of the United States and cross them.
Furthermore, these organizations also blur the line between nongovernmental
organizations ("NGOs") and government organizations, for they are voluntary,
quasi-private associations of public actors.
Several of these organizations were founded in the early part of the
twentieth century in efforts to bring local actors together to protect their
interests as the national government expanded. The local groups sought
federal aid while aiming to avoid federal regulation. Over the course of that
century, these translocal public/private organizations have broadened their own
horizons, both in terms of the issues that they address and the borders that they
cross. Seeking good will and new markets, these translocal actors have
become transnational actors. Their agendas range from trade and self-
promotion to human rights and climate control, and they coordinate with their
counterparts around the world.
Through these activities, these translocal organizations serve as importers
and exporters of ideas, some of which they help to turn into law. Sitting
between the government and the private sector, these national organizations of
state officials have become vital forces in a norm entrepreneurship that I term
translocal institutional transnationalism. These interactions create a two-way
4 See discussion infra Part n.B-C; see also Margaret E. McGuinness, Medellfn, Norm Portals. and the
Horizontal Integration of International Human Rights, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 755 (2006) (mapping the
effect of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations on American death penalty jurisprudence).
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street (or ocean) for both importation and exportation, and what passes through
are a range of precepts, liberal and conservative, on an array of topics from
human rights and national security to the organization of families and
commerce.
One of the goals of this Article is to document some of this trade in ideas
and laws and to analyze how translocal transnationalism relates to the
presumed problem of "foreign" law within the American polity. I do so by two
examples, one outlining local efforts to promote and to use the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women ("CEDAW"),5 and the other sketching the engagement of cities in the
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change ("Kyoto Protocol,,).6 Both initiatives undermine the sovereigntist
claim that a tum to "foreign" law intrinsically poses problems for
majoritarianism and for federalism.
Moreover, the examples of CEDAW and of Kyoto also substantiate my
arguments that the import and export of law over time is inevitable and that the
categories of "local" and "national" and "international" are mutable rather than
fixed. Topics once assumed uniquely subject to local governance are now
matters taken up by transnational norms and laws. Thus, what falls within the
realm of "foreign affairs" and "domestic affairs" has, will, and (in my view)
should change over time. Rather than being exclusive sets, the overlap is
substantial, as many issues are both "domestic" and "foreign." Moreover,
while my discussion focuses on the United States, the phenomenon that I
document is underway elsewhere. Around the world, localities have moved
outside their own nation-states and affect intergovernmental relations as part of
the "re-scaling" of governance (to borrow Saskia Sassen's term7) that reflects
changes in population density and in migration which are facilitated by
technologies and travel.8
5 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249
U.N.T.S. 20378 (entered into force Sept. 3,1981) [hereinafterCEDAW].
6 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997,37 I.L.M.
22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol], available at http://un(ccc.intJessentiaCbackgroundlkyoto_protocoVitemslI678.
php.
7 See Saskia Sassen, Globalization or Denationalization?, 10 REv. INT'!. POL EcON. 1,6, 14-15 (2003)
[hereinafter Sassen, Globalization or Denationalization ?].
8 See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503 (2007); Nicole
Bolleyer, Federal Dynamics in Canada. the United States. and Switzerland: How SubslOtes' Internal
Organizations Affect Intergovernmental Relations, 36 PUBLIUS J. FEDERALISM 471 (2006); Michele M. Betsill
& Harriet Bulkeley, Cities and the Multilevel Governance of Global Climate Change, 12 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 141 (2006); Michele M. Betsill & Harriet Bulkeley, Transnational Networks and Global
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But showing the fact of local import and export does not decide the issue of
whether to try to regulate the trade in law, which is the second focus of this
Article. Currently, efforts are underway to do just that through erecting
barriers rather than having a laissez faire or "free-trade" approach. Below I
examine in detail two mechanisms-one from Congress aimed at limiting
judicial use of "foreign" law and the second, from federal courts, aimed at
limiting localities' involvement with issues deemed "foreign." As to the first, I
consider both congressional proposals seeking to prohibit federal judges from
citing or relying on "foreign" law when interpreting the United States
Constitution9 and senatorial inquiries about judicial nominees' attitudes to the
use of "foreign" law in federal courts. As to the second, I explore the contours
of a cluster of precepts grouped under the doctrine of "foreign affairs
preemption" that has been used by federal judges to invalidate some local
legislative efforts related to issues that judges see as exclusively within
national authority. Examples include courts holding illegal local bans on
purchases from countries condoning forced labor and on investments in
companies tied to the Sudan. lO
How is one to reason about these regulatory efforts? Ought laws
addressing the role of non-United States law in either federal courts or state
and local decisionmaking be made at all? If so, by what institutions
(legislatures, the executive, or courts, state or national), and with what content?
What is the relationship between federalism and preemption?
Were one to seek answers to these questions from the text of the
Constitution, disappointment would rapidly follow. Although referring to the
word state more than one hundred times, 1I the United States Constitution never
Environmental Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program, 48 INT'L STUDIES Q. 471 (2004);
Franz Gress, Interstate Cooperation and Territorial Representation in Intermestic Politics, 26 PUBLIUS J.
FEDERALISM, Winter 1996, at 53; see also generally Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2007); Paul Schiff Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE J. INT'L
L. 301 (2007).
9 E.g., Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S. 520, 109th Congo (2005). In addition, section 6(a)(2) of
the Military Commissions Act ("MCA"), which became law in 2006, purports to limit the ability of federal
judges to use non-United States law when interpreting obligations under the Geneva Convention.. See Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2632 (2006) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.c. § 2441); see also discussion infra note 148 (discussing the Military Commissions Act of 2006).
10 See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v.
Giannoulias, No. 06 C 4251,2007 WL 627630, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2007), discussed infra Part III.B.
II An electronic search of the document finds that word mentioned 118 times in the text and its
amendments, excluding its use as a verb and within terms such as United States and foreign state. E.g., U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 3, c1. I ('The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State,
chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.") (emphasis added); id.
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even uses the word federalism, let alone terms like foreign affairs preemption.
And while allocating power between state and national governments, the
Constitution only sketches areas of competency without a specificity that
would decide many of the questions posed today.
For example, the Constitution's text refers six times to the word foreign-
including providing Congress with the power to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations," to regulate the value of "foreign Coin" as well as prohibiting
Congress from conferring titles from any "foreign state" and forbidding states
from entering into compacts with "a foreign Power.,,12 Further, Article I
authorizes Congress to define and punish "Offenses against the Law of
Nations,',13 which could be read to authorize federal incorporation of non-
United States law.
But unlike constitutions such as that of South Africa, which mandates that
judges consider international law when interpreting the domestic bill of
rights,14 the United States Constitution does not expressly address what role
government actors (state or federal) can playas importers of "foreign" law.
Nor does the Constitution identify the role courts ought to play in protecting
presidential agendas from decisions in Congress or by states and localities.
Moreover, if looking for guidance on the meaning of the category "foreign
affairs" from historical "traditions" about the allocation of authority between
state and federal governments, one finds that practices have not been uniform.
For example, although the United States Constitution vested the power in
Congress to develop "a uniform Rule of Naturalization,',15 Congress relied on
states to administer oaths and admit individuals to citizenship up through the
early part of the twentieth century when the administration shifted to a
§ 8, cl. 3 (''To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes ....") (emphasis added); id. § 9, cl. 5 ("No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any
State.") (emphasis added).
12 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3; id. cl. 5; id. § 9, cl. 8; id. § 10 cl. 3. The other two mentions of the
word come in Article III and the Eleventh Amendment. See id. art. III, § 2, cl. I (''The judicial Power shall
extend ... to Controversies ... between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or
Subjects."); id. amend. XI (''The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
13 {d. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
14 S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, § 39 ("When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum--
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality
and freedom; (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law."). These provisions are
analyzed in Resnik, Law as Affiliation, supra note 2.
15 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4.
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federally centered regime. 16 Further, during the nineteenth century, states
played a role in admitting (or banning) imrnigrants. 17 Since the nation's
inception, localities have been trading partners with countries around the
world. Turning to the construction of the idea of the "federal," arenas of
authority today within the federal bailiwick-including employment, drug
laws, education, and spousal property rights to pensions-were once
understood as particularly appropriate for state regulation.
If one question is how to decide the respective competencies or overlap
between state and federal decisionmaking, another is what organs of
government ought to make such rules. Over the last seventy years, conflict
about the arenas of authority of state and national actors has been intense. A
good many cases arise in the context of challenges claiming that the national
government has overreached; the discussion has centered on what national
institutions (the courts, Congress or the Executive) ought to arbitrate between
state and national interests so as to "safeguard" (to borrow Herbert Wechsler's
famous phrase l8) state prerogatives.
Writing in the 1950s, Wechsler's view was that courts ought not to demur
because Congress was well situated to provide "political" protections to states.
Given that Congress is comprised of representatives from the states and each
state has two senators, Wechsler reasoned that states had ample opportunity to
press for protection of their interests in the national forum. Among his critics,
Lynn Baker-writing in the 1990s-turned to horizontal comparisons across
states and identified the variability of the political and economic resources of
different states in protecting their own interests. 19 Hence, responding to the
issue of whether the Supreme Court ought, in the name of federalism,
16 See, e.g., The Naturalization Act of 1906, ch. 3592, §§ 1--4, 34 Stat. 596 (1906); DARRELL HEVENOR
SMITH, THE BUREAU OF NATURALIZATION: ITS HISTORY, AcnvrnEs AND ORGANIZATION (1926).
17 See Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention ofAliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen
Knauffand Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PENN. L. REv. 933,941--43 (1995).
18 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954). A significant
literature followed thereafter. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a- Vis the States:
The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back
into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 215 (2000). More recently, Bradford Clark
has focused on how separation of powers doctrine and the difficulties of making federal law preserve stale
prerogatives. See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEx. L. REv.
1321 (2001).
19 Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 YILt.. L.
REv. 951 (2001) [hereinafter Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back]; see also Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A.
Young, Federalism and the Double Standard ofJudicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 106 (2001).
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invalidate congressional legislation,20 Baker argued that the national courts had
a role to play in safeguarding state interests.
These debates reflect that, while the Constitution also does not speak of the
vertical and the horizontal dimensions of federalism, the jurisprudence of the
federal courts does. When focused on the so-called vertical axis, at issue is the
relationship between the national government and the states. By virtue of
constitutional text making federal law "supreme," state courts must enforce
federal law,21 and Congress can (in areas within its competency) legislatively
preempt state law. If a conflict between state and federal law is claimed, the
United States Supreme Court has interpretative authority to decide whether
federal law requires that state rules be displaced. 22 Looking "horizontally," the
legal literature considers the constitutional relationship among the states.23
Here the focus is on issues such as the states' constitutional obligation to
provide "full faith and credit" to each others' judgments, on the constitutional
prohibition of states entering into "compacts" unless fIrst obtaining statutory
approval from Congress, as well as the obligations of the national government
to respect that each state is on an "equal footing" with the others?4
20 The now-classic examples include National League of Cities v. Usery. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and the
line of cases that reversed it: Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985),
Printz v. United States, 521 U.s. 898 (1997), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
21 See generally STATE SUPREME COURTS, POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, at xix-xx (Mary
Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1982).
22 See generally Tom Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2(08)
(on file with author); Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 1353 (2006); Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 767 (1994)
[hereinafter Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption]. For an overview of a set of cases, the participants, and
outcomes, see Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary
Empirical Assessment, 14 SUP. CT. EcON. REV. 43 (2006). Reflective of the growing focus on preemption, the
American Enterprise Institute published a volume of readings on it in 2007. See FEDERAL PREEMPTION:
STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, eds. 2(07).
23 See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1468 (2007). The term horizontal federalism is used sometimes to capture states' interactions and cooperation
and other times to describe discord and competition. See, e.g., Ann O'M. Bowman, Horizontal Federalism:
Exploring Interstate Interactions, 14 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 535 (2004); James N.G. Cauthem,
Horizontal Federalism in the New Judicial Federalism: A Preliminary Look at Citations, 66 ALB. L. REv. 783
(2003). The term horizontal federalism may have come into U.S. parlance from comparative federalism
analyses. See ARNOLD BRECHT, FEDERALISM AND REGIONALISM IN GERMANY: THE DIVISION OF PRUSSIA 47
(1945). On the interaction at the agency level, see Robert Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV.
863 (2006).
24 See Eric Biber, The Price ofAdmission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions Imposed on States
Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119 (2004).
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Translocal transnationalism complicates the tidiness of a grid that plots
only the vertical and horizontal dimensions of the interaction between
individual states and the national government.25 Furthermore, the laws
produced through such networks have generated a new pattern in the case law.
During much of the second half of the twentieth century, localities and states
went to federal court seeking protection from Congress. In cases such as
National League of Cities v. Usery,26 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,27 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,28 and New York v.
United States,29 representatives of states argued that either the Tenth or
Eleventh Amendment or federalism itself required invalidation of national
legislation obliging them to act in particular ways.
In contrast, in the contemporary set of cases, nationally networked groups
of businesses, sometimes joined by spokespersons for the federal government,
go to federal courts arguing on behalf of the President or Congress, which they
posit, needs judicial protection from state and local initiatives. Relying on
legislation or agency regulations and executive statements, mixed with claims
predicated on the Constitution, such plaintiffs argue that foreign affairs, war
powers, the political question doctrine, or dormant commerce clause powers,
as well as the President's prerogatives more generally, require preclusion of
local actions that affect "foreign" or international activities. 30
Thus far, the federal judiciary has been both deferential to such claims and
generative in its own right, shaping a legal regime preferring the singularity of
national power. Currently underway is the development of a body of case law
loosely grouped under the moniker of foreign affairs preemption, which, I
argue, generates ''judicial safeguards of national power." These doctrines
protect both Congress and the authority of the Executive from the
"interventions" of local decisions that are the products of democratic initiatives
championed by elected leaders as part of translocal networks of local
government officials.
25 As Michael Greve, a "proud nationalist" worried about states' exportation of regulatory burdens, has
noted, this coordination could enhance certain federalist values at the expense of others. See Michael S.
Greve, Federalism Values and Foreign Relations, 2 CHI. J.INT'L L. 355 (2001) [hereinafter Greve, Federalism
Values].
26 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
27 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
28 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
29 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
30 Here, the examples, discussed infra, include at the Supreme Court level, Crosby v. National Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000), and American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
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What ought courts to do? My argument, foreshadowed above through a
brief reminder about what words lie within the constitutional text, is that
judges have a wide range of interpretative choices to make. Like the analyses
of both Wechsler and Baker, background presumptions about how the system
is or ought to work inform responses to these litigation efforts. For me, the
federated system within the United States-with its hundred-plus mentions of
the word state in the Constitution and its tripartite division of federal power-
entails aspirations for transparent, redundant debates about laws and policies.
These multiple sites for conflicts about social norms are the opportunities
provided by democratic federalism to permit problems to be argued in more
than one forum and more than once. When city councils or state legislatures
propose provisions incorporating foreign norms or shaping local action seeking
either to import transnational precepts or to have extraterritorial effects, these
measures are put forth in public and voted up or down. From immigration to
same-sex marriage, from land mines to apartheid and genocide, those debates
have enabled law to change-in directions that can be characterized as liberal
and as conservative-through an iterative process.
I do not suggest that the outcomes of such contestation are either optimal or
to my personal liking, nor that problems of aggrandizement, capture, cartels,
and overreaching are absent. But the reiterated conflicts are desirable because
they enable us to watch and to participate in struggles over the content of the
law of the United States. Of course, and akin to the concerns raised by
Professor Baker, that playing field is not even, and the rules are not fair. Yet,
like Wechsler, when possible I take as a lesson from democratic federalism
that battles over the meaning of federal law should presumptively be open to
changes through legislation. Moreover, when laws are built through a
multitude of local efforts (even as those efforts are produced through networks
seeking to orchestrate them), the rules inscribed become more entrenched as
localities embrace specific precepts and link their civic identity to them in a
fashion that sovereigntists should admire.
Hence, I am a critic of the new preemption rules in which judges shape
quasi-constitutional doctrines limiting federalism's iterative opportunities. I
commend revisiting the growing presumption in favor of executive or
congressional foreign affairs preemption, and flipping it in favor of local
initiatives. Before finding that national action is the exclusive means of
interacting with "the foreign," judges ought to require specific national
legislative directives as well as the presentation of detailed factual information
about how concurrent or overlapping rules (federal and state) do harm national
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interests. By insisting on '~clear statement rules" from Congress and specific
factual predicates about the harms of concurrency before preempting local
initiatives, the courts would be letting the "political safeguards of federalism"
(to return to Wechsler's phrase) serve as a primary mechanism to "safeguard
nationalism." Judges ought to be leery of using their power to expand the
unilateralism of executive authority. Rather than ignoring that issues are
simultaneously "foreign" and "domestic" affairs, courts should find local
initiatives invalid only when enough national representatives of states vote for
federal legislation expressly depriving states and localities of the power to act
in a particular arena, in a specific fashion, and that a state or local action falls
within those parameters, or a factual record shows that legal actors cannot
comply with the layers of state and national regulation.
But this Article's foray into translocal transnationalism entails a third
agenda-which is aimed at engendering skepticism about the pastoral image of
democratic processes at the local level and provoking research about both the
potentially positive and negative aspects of the translocal institutions that I
bring into focus. When citing to "local" activities on women's rights and on
climate control (the examples here) or to other issues (including immigration,
trade, and marriage), one needs to be aware that such initiatives are not
indigenous democratic moments in which each locality spontaneously finds
and then expresses its own internal commitments.
Rather, these efforts are part of a new form of translocal governance that
does not (yet) have a niche in the vocabulary, jurisprudence, or theories of
federalism. Despite the ideology of each state acting alone as one of fifty
within the United States, the practice is increasingly coordinated, in part in
response to translocal businesses and NGOs, lobbying across jurisdictions, and
to a media similarly unleashed from territorial constraints. One of the
challenges for the decade is to learn more about governmental networks so as
to evaluate them in terms of the political values of transparency and
accountability, as well as on welfarists' concerns about the quality and kinds of
policies that they support. At issue for law is how to weave the fact of such
joint action into legal theories that aspire to celebrate the diversity, the
potential for redundancy, the distribution of power entailed in the potential
singularity of each state, and the differences among states?1 The law of
federalism at this juncture does not correspond to the transformations in the
31 See. e.g., Michael S. Greve, Cartel Federalism? Antitrust Enforcement by State Attorneys General, 72
U. CHI. L. REv. 99 (2005) [hereinafter Greve, Cartel Federalism?]; Baker & Young, supra note 19.
HeinOnline -- 57 Emory L.J. 43 2007-2008
2007] FOREIGN AS DOMESTIC AFFAIRS 43
landscape of federalism, and that terrain in tum ought not to be perceived as a
bucolic site in which democratic practices inevitably flourish.
Finally, to see the inevitability, the utility, the risks, and the democratic
processes entailed in the import and export of law is not to ignore the attraction
of using law to build communities of affiliation and calling them nations.
Anxiety about the fragility of the nation-state is well founded, and those
seeking to preserve its form are therefore looking for means to do so. One way
in which to build national collective identity is for individuals to understand
that shared laws are part of why and how they are in relationship to each other
as, together, they form a nation. Yet, one can welcome learning from abroad
while still insisting that certain behavior is constituent of national identity and
therefore obligatory as a matter of "our law,'.32
The many conflicts about the meaning of "our" constitutional commitments
ought to be understood as a positive facet of an ongoing democratic process in
which social movements from across the political spectrum disagree about the
application of a polity's legal precommitments. Those social movements are,
in tum, framed by currents coming from within and from abroad. And within
these currents, one can find an array of public and private sector actors,
arguing that American law means what they hope it does.
II. TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL MOVEMENTS AND FEDERALISM
A. Horizontal Federalism and the Institutions ofTranslocalism: National
Organizations ofLocal Officials
The analytic presumptions of much of the law on federalism posits each
state as a single, isolated actor, always on an equal footing, and sometimes in
competition, with other states. One can read a good deal about "races to the
bottom,,33 but less about the many joint actions undertaken by states, either at
the formal level of the Constitution's "Compact Clause" (requiring
32 Inclusive sovereigntism-insisting that one's national identity is predicated on exchanges from
abroad-is an option, as South Africa's Constitution exemplifies. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
33 See. e.g.• Richard L. Revesz, Rehabiliting Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-
Bottom" Rationalefor Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.V. L. REv. 1210 (1992); Richard L. Revesz,
The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535
(1997).
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congressional approval) or the more frequent coordinated initiatives, only
some of which become formal multistate executive orders.34
Horizontal federalism-state-to-state interactions of a variety of kinds-is
coming into view as a subject for the legal academy,35 as is an interest in
localism and regionalism.36 But the role played by local officials working in
concert, captured by my term transloeal institutionalism, has drawn less
attention.37 These shared projects are the subject of the first point of this
Article, focused on how these translocal networks produce law through
America's federal model. 38 These various organizations, including the
National League of Cities, the United States Conference of Mayors, the
National Conference of State Legislatures, the National Governors'
Association, the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the
National Conference of Chief Justices of State Courts, are conduits for border
crossings, both state-to-state and internationally.39 These entities, which
mirror the tiered structure of American federalism,40 sit somewhat in between
34 A body of case law and a relatively small academic literature explores the Compact Clause. Felix
Frankfurter and James Landis led the way as they analyzed trans-state creations. See Felix Frankfurter &
James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE LJ.
685 (1925); see also Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent, 68 Mo. L. REV. 285
(2003) [hereinafter Greve, Compacts, Cartels]; Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic
Society: The Problem of Permanency, 49 FLA. L. REv. I (1997); Judith Resnik, Afterword: Federalism's
Options, 14 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 465 (1996) [hereinafter Resnik, Federalism's Options].
35 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468
(2007); McGuinness, supra note 4; Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water
Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405 (2006); Wayne A. Logan, Horizontal
Federalism in an Age of Criminal Justice Interconnectedness, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 257 (2005); Scott
Fruehwald, The Rehnquist Court and Horizontal Federalism: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Moderate
Constitutional Constraints on Horizontal Federalism, 81 DENV. U. L. REv. 289 (2003); Lynn A. Baker, The
Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4CHAP. L. REV. 195 (2001) [herinafter Baker, Spending Power].
36 See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era ofState
Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959 (2007); David J. Barron, A Localist Critique ofthe New Federalism, 51 DUKE
L.J. 377 (2001); Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REv. I (2000).
37 Professor McGuinness is interested in the role that international law plays domestically, with a focus
on a "transnational network of human rights activists, NGOs, and defense lawyers" using what she terms
"norm portals," defined as gateways that "through a formal procedural mechanism or substantive right,"
permit the importation of "external norms into a legal system." McGuiness, supra note 4, at 760-61; see also
Janet Koven Levit, A Tale of International Law in the Heartland: Torres and the Role of State Courts in
Transnational Legal Conversation, 12 TuLSA J. COMPo & lNT'L L. 163 (2004).
38 For a parallel concern, that international efforts by local governments are paid too little attention by
political scientists, see Terrence Guay, Local Government and Global Politics: The Implications of
Massachusetts' "Burma Law," 115 POL SCI. Q. 353, 354 (2000).
39 See, e.g., GLOBAL NElWORKS, LINKED CrnEs (Saskia Sassen ed., 2002).
40 See Theda Skocpol, The Tocqueville Problem: Civic Engagement in American Democracy, 21 Soc.
SCI. HIST. 455, 472 (1997); see also Theda Skocpol, Marshall Ganz & Ziad Munson, A Nation ofOrganizers:
The Institutional Origins ofCivic Voluntarism in the United States, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 527 (2000).
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the classic NGO and the state in that the political clout of such organizations
comes from their serving as the collective voice of actors holding particular
kinds of governmental positions.
In the literature on social movements, networks of activists are familiar
actors, bringing parallel and coordinated initiatives across a spectrum of issues.
But much of the discussion of such "norm entrepreneurs" assumes that they are
nongovernmental organizations aimed at affecting civil society. Law
professors have interjected that judges need to be understood as norm
entrepreneurs as well, participating in networks and shaping doctrine.41
Translocal organizations of government officials, which have political and
social capital because of the identity of their members as public employees,
should also be added to the mix.
These governmental "interest groups" were formed during the twentieth
century to lobby local interests in states and to protect localities from national
encroachments by forwarding municipal agendas in Washington. These
groups also aimed to create working relationships for similarly situated
individuals who could learn from each other as they responded to parallel
challenges. With the nationalization and globalization of the economy, these
groups have broadened their horizons. They are entering into accords and
forging links with other subnational entities around the world in a fashion that
one commentator argued went beyond the ability of the national government to
"control, supervise, or even monitor.,,42 Through what Saskia Sassen
described as the "re-scaling,,43 of inter-governmental relationships and what I
have discussed in the context of the United States as examples of "federalism's
options,',44 a myriad of opportunities for import and export are presented.
Much of the local work is aimed at promoting trade and tourism, but a
subset reaches a wider array of issues, including human rights. Further, while
many of the international activities involve officials going abroad to enhance a
locality's economic opportunities, some entail the development of policy
agendas addressed either horizontally toward other localities or states or
41 See Harold Hongju Koh, Foreword: On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479 (2003);
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L LJ. 191 (2003); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103 (2000).
42 EARL H. FRy, THE ExPANDING ROLE OF STATE AND locAL GOVERNMENTS IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS 128
(1998) [hereinafter FRy, THE EXPANDING ROLE].
43 Sassen, Globalization or Denationalization?, supra note 7, at 6, 14-15.
44 Resnik, Federalism's Options, supra note 34, at 465.
HeinOnline -- 57 Emory L.J. 46 2007-2008
46 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57
vertically towards the national government or transnationally.45 As will be
detailed below, some of these initiatives are expressive and hortatory, calling
for a shift in national poticy, while others are programmatic in the sense that
they generate internal obligations by incorporating transnational precepts into
local law.
Specifying exactly what work is ongoing is challenging-in part because
the differential resources of states make for varied databases and episodic
information, and in part because translocal institutions are in the midst of
reformulating their own agendas as they consider shifting toward international
activities.46 One method of quantifying these efforts is to assess bills proposed
or enacted by state legislatures. For example, in the first six months of the
calendar year of 2007, state legislatures considered 1,404 bills related to
immigration. The provisions ranged from efforts to sanction employers of
undocumented immigrants to limiting access to driver licenses and public
benefits.47
By way of comparison, another analysis of actlvltles in legislatures
between 2001 and 2002 concluded that state legislatures were "taking on the
world," as researchers found 886 bills and resolutions that had "significant
international content.,,48 According to this database, about a third of the almost
900 proposals related to what the researchers coded as "international" issues
became local law. The subject matters ranged from national defense to human
rights, from trade to immigration.49 The researchers also identified a trend, in
that the number of state bills within the category of the "international" had
increased over the decade. Their content had also changed, in that security
45 See infra Part II.B-e.
46 For example, the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) has
convened a subcommittee to consider whether that body ought to participate in negotiations about international
agreements affecting courts, because the Conference is "increasingly impacted by global jurisprudential
developments." See JOHN A. CHANIN, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, SUB-
COMMITTEE REPORT REGARDING CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING POSSIBLE NCCUSL INVOLVEMENT IN
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS I (2005), available at hnp://www.nccusl.org/nccusVDocslRpC
Criteria%20for%20NCCUSL%20Involvemenc072405.pdf.
47 2007 Enacted State Legislation Related to Immigrants and Immigration, Immigration Policy Project
(Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 6, 2007, http://www.ncsl.org/programsl
immig/2oo7immigrationupdate.htm; see also Julia Preston, Immigration Is at Center of New Laws Around
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at A12.
48 Timothy J. Conlan, Robert L. Dudley & Joel F. Clark, Taking On the World: The International
Activities of American State Legislatures, 34 PuBLIUS J. FEDERALISM, Summer 2004, at 183, 186. The
research itself was sponsored by the Council of State Governments and received federal funding through the
U.S. Agency for International Development. Id. at 183 (authors' note).
49 See id. at 186-88.
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issues rose to the fore after 9/11, while global warming bills declined-in part
because many had been put into place earlier.5o In terms of interstate
comparisons, while the number of bills or resolutions introduced averaged
around eighteen, some states had no legislative proposals and others, such as
Texas, had ninety-three.51
Some of this legislative activIty entailed creating new institutional
structures within states to respond to international issues. For example, by
means of a survey of state legislatures, researchers learned about the "Alaska
Senate Special Committee on World Trade and StatelFederal Relations," and
the "Oklahoma Joint Special Committee on International Development.,,52
Attempting to model the variables, the researchers identified the value of a
state's exports as the "most powerful predictor of the number of internationally
related bills.,,53 Also relevant was the input from translocal institutions
because many legislators are part of networks (such as the "nonpartisan"
Council of State Governments and National Conference of State Legislatures)
or organizations which run the gamut from "conservative" to "the left" (such
as the American Legislative Exchange Council, the Center for Policy
Alternatives, and the State Environmental Resource Center).54 Thus, while
some state actors are motivated by trade concerns and others by human rights,
and some want to impose barriers while others want eased access to
commodities from abroad, their combined energies take issues once cast as
"foreign" and make them "domestic" as well.
The development of the National League of Cities (NLC) provides another
illustration. That organization emerged in 1964 from what had been called the
American Municipal Association, formed in 1924 by representatives of ten
cities.55 Prompted in part to overcome state barriers to "special legislation"
50 See id. at 189-91.
51 [d. at 191.
52 /d. at 188.
53 [d. at 194. Other variables explored were the professionalization of the legislators and the percent of
the population that was foreign born. See id. Motivations for transnational action include lobbyists, the media,
and international travel. [d. at 196-97.
54 [d. at 196.
55 NAT'L lEAGUE OF CITIES, 75 YEARS: OPPORTUNITY, lEADERSIDP, GOVERNANCE: FROM LAWRENCE,
KANSAS TO TIffi 21ST CENTURY I (1999). The movement to generate "leagues" of American municipalities began
in the 18905, with a Conference of State Leagues of Municipalities meeting in 1917. /d. at 8-9. In 1977, the NLC
changed its membership rules to pennit entry from any city, regardless of population size. Inside NLC,
http://www.nlc.orgfinside_n1c1aboucnlcl792.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 2(07); see also Bertram Johnson, Associated
Municipalities: Collective Action and the Formation of the State League of Cities, 29 Soc. SO. H1ST. 549 (2005);
DoNALD L. JONES, STATE MUNIOPAL LEAGUES: THE FtRsT HUNDRED YEARS (1999); Clifford W. Ham, State
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that gave aid to particular cities, local governments began to work together
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, first within states and
thereafter crossing state lines.56 As a consequence, a "nation-wide network of
policy entrepreneurs" has developed to exchange information, deal with
collective action problems, and in tum generate new affiliations.57
Moving from the national to the international arena, Cold War concerns
prompted the creation of the Sister Cities Program. That project began during
the second half of the Eisenhower Administration as "people-to-people"
diplomacy to promote affection for democratic institutions. More recently, and
with funding through federal grants (exemplifying aspects of cooperative
federalism), the organization became Sister Cities International (albeit with its
home office in Washington and an entirely American board of directors). It
links 126 countries and 2500 communities worldwide.58
But NLC agendas are framed around more than trade and good will. The
organization also seeks to bring attention to a host of challenges for cities,
including providing adequate housing and education, enhancing "opportunity
and inclusiveness," respecting diverse cultures,59 and responding to the
problems of "inequalities in our cities.,,6o Thus, while "National League of
Cities" has become shorthand in the jurisprudence of the federal courts for a
(short-lived) Supreme Court decision recognizing a locality's Tenth
Amendment exemption from federal regulation,61 we should also learn to
associate that name with energetic support for network-building, both local and
globa1.62
Leagues of Municipalities and the American Municipal Association: An Experiment in Cooperation Among
Municipal Officials, 31 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 1132 (1937).
56 See Johnson, supra note 55. at 550-51.
57 Id. at 569.
58 See Sister Cities International: Frequently Asked Questions, httpJ/www.sister-cities.orglscil
aboutscilfaqs (last visited Nov. 4. 2(07). NLC ran the Sister Cities Program until a separate organization was
created. SeeJames Brooks. NLC. Sister Cities Enhancing Ties, NATION'S CTI1ES WKLY., Mar. 26, 2001, at 6.
59 WILLIAM B. STAFFORD, GLOBALLY COMPETITIVE REGIONS: WHAT SEATTlE Is LEARNING FROM THE REsT
OF THE WORLD 6-9 (1999).
60 See FY 2004 STRATEGIC 1'LAN UPDATE (Nat'l League of Cities, Washington, D.C.), 2004, at 2, available at
httpJ/www.nlc.orglASSETSIFIF9EA5BDCFD45E2A5FIA07AC II DB8CO/stratplanfy2004.doc (listing this as
priority number eight for the NLC in fiscal year 2004).
61 See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
62 See FRY, THE ExPANDING ROLE, supra note 42; Earl H. Fry, Stare and Local Governments in the
International Arena, 509 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 118 (1990); see also U.S.-AsIA ENvTL. P'SHIP,
FEDERAL REsOURCE GUIDE FOR SUPPORTING STATE INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT: COPING, COMPETING, AND
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The NLC further sharpened its global focus by becoming active in what is
now the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), an international
organization that resulted from the merger of the International Union of Local
Authorities, the World Federation of United Cities, and Metropolis.63 The
UCLG describes local governments as "key" forces for promoting human
rights64 and identifies itself as the "main source of support for . . . local
government" to work with the United Nations, as well as an entity committed
to protecting local governments' authority.65
Moving from the work of state legislatures and cities to translocal efforts
more generally, those activities both have a long pedigree and span a range of
concerns.
66 Examples run from the nineteenth-century American Anti-Slavery
Society campaign (which relied on "mass-produced" petitions for local
organizations to send to Congress)67 to a host of twentieth-century initiatives
seeking to alter the conduct of the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and the
conflicts in Northern Ireland and in the Middle East, as well as promotion of
nuclear disarmament,68 protection against land mines, the end of apartheid in
South Africa,69 restitution for holocaust victims,70 gun control,71 and stopping
COOPERATING IN AGLOBAL EcONOMY (2002), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdCdocsIPNACR090.pdf(outlining
where localities can find funds for such work).
63 See Donald J. Bomt, Stepping Up to the Internntional Agenda, NATION'S CITIEs WKLY., Jan. 19, 1998, at 2;
United Cities and Local Governments, 2004 Founding Congress, httpJlwww.cities-localgovernments.orgluclgl
index.asp?pag=template.asp&l..=EN&ID=103 (last visited Nov. 4, 2(07).
64 Guy Kervella, Unification ofIULA and UFO Creates Largest International Local Government Association,
City Mayors, http://www.citymayors.comlorgslunitedcities.html(last visited Nov. 4, 2(07); United Cities and Local
Governments, About Us, http://www.cities-Iocalgovemments.orgluclglindex.asp?pag=template.asp&l..=EN&ID=2
(last visited Nov. 4, 2(07); see also United Cities and Local Governments, Promoting Women in Local Decision-
Making, http://www.cities-Iocalgovemments.orgluclglindex.asp?pag=template.asp&l..=EN&ID=23 (last visited
Nov. 4, 2(07) (discussing the UCLG coordination of local governments' contribution to the U.N. Women's
Conference on Beijing +10); Donald J. Bomt, Local Officials from Around the World Meet in China, NATION'S
CITIES WKLY., June 27, 2005, at 5, available at http://www.nlc.orglASSETS/OCBB3F88F94F423299857407685I3
24F/ncw062705.pdf.
65 Kervella, supra note 64.
66 See generally BRIAN HOCKING, LocALIZING FOREIGN POUCY: NON-cENTRAL GOVERNMENTS AND
MULTILAYERED DIPLOMACY (1993); Daniel Halberstam, The Foreign Affairs of Federal Systems: A National
Perspective on the Benefits ofState Participation, 46 VtLL. L. REv. 1015, 1032-40 (2001).
67 BETTY FLAoELAND, MEN AND BROTHERS: ANGLO-AMERICAN ANTISLAVERY COOPERATION 177 (1972)
(noting that in the 18205 and 18305, more than 200 antislavery societies sent hundreds of petitions to the British
Parliament to abolish slavery).
68 See Shanna Singh, Note, Brandeis's Happy Incident Revisited: U.S. Cities as the New Laboratories of
Internntional Law, 37 GEO. WASH.INT'L L. REv. 537,548-49 (2005).
69 See JANICE loVE, THE U.S. ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT: LocAL ACTIVISM IN GLOBAL POLITICS (1985).
70 See MICHAELJ. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE 128-35 (2003).
71 See Sewell Chan, 52 Mayors Unite in Washington to Curb Illegal Firearms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
2007, at B6.
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of wildlife products.75 Given the range, one commentator forecast that
"[u]nless America becomes a police state, municipal foreign policies are here to
stay.,,76
Translocal organizations of local officials exist for the various branches of
government and for many different kinds of actors, including judges, attorneys,
police, correction officers, governors, mayors, and legislators. The nature of
the work of those different officials and their structural positions within states
may well alter the kinds of networks they generate, the range of issues they
engage, the positions taken, the level of expertise and knowledge, the resources
available, the quality of the policies promoted, and how law might treat them.77
My focus in this Article is limited to the work of governors, city councils,
and of mayors, sometimes in individual states and sometimes through
translocal action who, as popularly elected officials, engage with transnational
conventions or affiliate with transnational human rights efforts.78 Below, I
provide two examples of such work-the first, promoting CEDAW, is aimed at
enhancing the substantive equality of women while the second, on climate
control, underscores that opposition predicated upon the exclusive sovereign
identity of the United States is by no means limited to projects aimed at human
rights.
B. Engendering Equality by Gender Mainstreaming: The Example ofCEDAW
States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social,
economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including
72 See Jennifer Steinhauer, Democrats in State Capitols Push Antiwar Resolutions, N.Y. DMES, Feb. 16,
2007, at A14; Singh, supra note 68, at 545.
73 See, e.g., Save Sudan, http://www.savesudan.org; see also infr notes 203-30 and accompanying text.
74 See Adrian Barnes, Note, Do They Have to Buy from Burma?: A Preemption Analysis of Local
Antisweatshop Procurement Laws, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 426 (2007); Guay, supra, note 38 at 357 (as of 2000,
four states and twenty-six municipalities had enacted economic sanction laws aimed at Burma, Nigeria, or
other countries).
75 See Viva! Int'l Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., 162 P.3d 569 (Cal.
2007) (upholding a state statute banning the importation of products made from kangaroos against a challenge
that state law was preempted by the federal Endangered Species Act).
76 Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main Street: Local Foreign Policies, 65 FOREIGN POL'y 154, 171 (1987).
77 See, e.g., Greve, Cartel Federalism?, supra note 31 at 110-11, 121-22 (raising concerns about the
agreement entered into by forty-six state attorneys general with tobacco manufacturers).
78 See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, Gubernatorial Foreign Policy, 115 YALE LJ. 2380 (2006); Nat'l League of
Cities, Briefing Paper: Local Governments Making a Better World (Nov. 2006), http://www.nlc.orglASSETSI
AO I725B97 I7044FEA9F963FFA80106AF/ipissuepaperbetterworld I I2206.pdf (detailing worldwide
humanitarian and activist initiatives in which U.S. and international cities participate).
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legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement of women,
for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of
human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with
men.
51
Article 3, The Convention on the Elimination ofAll Fonns~
Discrimination Against Women (1981)
WHEREAS, There is precedent in the City of Philadelphia, as the home
of the Liberty Bell and Independence Hall, to take a strong stand against
all forms of discrimination, ....
WHEREAS, state and local governments have an appropriate and
legitimate role in affirming the importance of international law in our
communities as a universal norm and to serve as guidelines for public
policy ....
BE IT RESOLVED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF
PHILADELPHIA, That we hereby calion the United States Senate to
[ratify CEDAW].
Resolution ofthe Council ofthe City ofPhiladelphia (1998)80
The Board of Supervisors of the City and County of San Francisco
hereby finds and declares as follows: [CEDAW], an international human
rights treaty, provides a universal definition of discrimination against
women and brings attention to a whole range of issues concerning
women's human rights. . .. The City shall work towards integrating
gender equity and human rights principles into all of its operations,
including policy, program and budgetary decision-making ....
Resolution ofthe City and County ofSan Francisco (1998l1
The enactment of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 provided women
with the right to vote.82 Over the eighty years thereafter, rights to serve on
juries, to enter various professions, and to more equal opportunity as wage
earners followed.83 When these new laws are placed within a comparative
international frame, the American experiences can be seen as a piece of a large
international project about women's equality. On the specific issue of the
79 CEDAW, supra note 5, art. 3.
80 City Council, Res. 980148 (Phila., Pa. Mar. 12,1998).
81 City and County of San Francisco, Local Implementation of the United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of All Fonns of Discrimination Against Women, § 12.K.1 (Apr. 13, 1998).
82 U.S. CONST. amend. IXX.
83 See generally LINDA K. KERBER, No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND
OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1998).
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franchise, women gained voting rights in some nations-such as Finland in
1809 and New Zealand in 1893-and in some states-such as Wyoming in
1869 and Utah in 187O--decades before they became eligible in the United
States to vote in national elections.84
But the United States was not the last country to recognize women as
political participants. A few other countries, such as France and Switzerland,
did not authorize women to vote until decades later (1944 and 1971,
respectively).85 Switzerland's federated form endowed so much authority to
cantons that one canton refused to enfranchise women until 1990.86
The vote, however, proved itself to be only one piece of what equality
requires. As Virginia Woolf commented in the late 1920s-around the time
when women were gaining franchise rights in England87-between 500 pounds
a year (a guaranteed income which had come, to her, via a legacy from an
aunt) and the right to vote, the 500 pounds seemed "infinitely the more
important.,,88 That money could be used to secure safety ("a lock on a door")
and education by which to gain skills to earn a living and enable self-
sufficiency.
Mirroring Woolfs concerns, equality activists on the international stage
sought to protect women's rights to education, to physical safety, to health
care, to national citizenship independent of that of their marital partner, to
broader political participation, and to full access to wage work. Those
aspirations became enshrined in the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, or CEDAW as it has come to be
known, which entered into force in 1981.89
As the brief excerpt quoted at the beginning of this subsection illustrates,
CEDAW requires signatory states to take action in political, social, economic,
and cultural fields to "ensure the full development and advancement of
84 John Markoff, Margins, Centers, and Denwcracy: The Paradigmatic History ofWomen 's Suffrage, 29
SIGNS J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'Y, 85, 90--101 (2003).
85 [d. at 101-04.
86 [d. at 101.
87 In 1918, women who were thirty and met other qualifications became entitled to vote in England. [d.
at 96. In 1928, the age of eligibility became twenty-one. See id. at 110.
88 VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN 37 (Harvest Books 1989) (1929). The money was more
important, Woolf wrote, because "five hundred a year stands for the power to contemplate, [and] a lock on the
door means the power to think for oneself." [d.
89 See CEDAW, supra note 5; see also Division for the Advancement of Women, Short History of
CEDA W Convention, http://www.un.org/womenwatchldaw/cedawlhistory.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
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women" to enable them to have "human rights and fundamental freedoms on a
basis of equality with men. ,,90 Implementation occurs through reports, made
periodically by member states to CEDAW's twenty-three person committee,
which discharges its monitoring function by engaging in a public exchange
about a reporting nation's achievements and problerns.91
This form of norm elaboration provides a mechanism to integrate
transnational premises of equality into the very different contexts of nation-
states. CEDAW delineates categories of analyses but (aside from the potential
of a recently added optional protocol) cannot exercise coercive power to alter a
given nation's legal regime.92 Rather, CEDAW becomes the basis for self-
analyses and has been, in some countries, an impetus to reconfigure legal rules.
Many changes in national law are ascribed to making this transnational
commitment to CEDAW.93 Japan, for example, describes its work on
women's rights as part of its effort to be CEDAW-compliant.94 This
90 CEDAW, supra note 5, art. 3. Nancy Fraser's delineation of "rights of recognition" and of "redistribution"
and how the project of gender equality encompasses efforts to obtain both folmS of rights, at times through reifying
gender distinctions and at times by their diminution, helps to capture both the ambitions of CEDAW and some of the
tensions it entails. NANCY FRAsER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE "POSTSOCIALIST"
CONDmoN41-66 (1997).
91 See CEDAW, supra note 5, arts. 17-18. The CEDAW committee issues interpretive recommendations as
well as comments on reports. See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General
Recommendation No. 19, U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., Supp. No. 38, U.N. Doc. N47138 (Jan. 29, 1992) (specifying the
role that violence directed at women plays as a fonn of discrimination to be redressed by ratifying states). Countries
are supposed to submit detailed reports, followed by in-person presentations to respond to the committee's questions
posed at hearings held at the United Nations. See Sally Engle Merry, Constructing a Global Law-Violence Against
Women and the Human Rights System, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 941,954-74 (2003) (discussing the operations and
impact of the CEDAW committee).
92 This "optional protocol" permits individuals or groups, after exhausting national remedies, to file
complaints directly and authorizing the CEDAW. As of February 2007, 85 countries have joined the optional
protocol. See G.A. Res. 54/4, U.N. Doc. AlRES/54/4 (Oct. 15, 1999).
93 See Treaty Doc. 95-53: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Adopted by the u.N. General Assembly on December 18, 1979, and Signed on Behalf of the United States of
America on July 17,1980: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 107th Congo 17 (2002) [hereinafter
2002 CEDA W Hearings] (statement of Sen. Boxer) (citing effects in Colombia, Uganda, Costa Rica, Australia, and
Mexico, inter alia); itt. at 19 (statement of Sen. Dodd) (citing CEDAW'S effects on "citizenship rights in Botswana
and Japan, inheritance rights in the United Republic of Tanzania," and domestic violence laws in "Turkey, Nepal,
South Africa, and the Republic of Korea"); see also CEDAW: THE TREATY FOR THE RIGIITS OF WOMEN 46-48
(Leila Rassekh Milani, Sarah C. Albert & Karina Purushotma eds., 2004) [hereinafter CEDAW: THE TREATY
RIGIITS FOR WOMEN] (attributing to CEDAW changes in laws and practices relating to violence, education, and
security); UPDATED INFORMATION ON CEDAW: THE TREATY FOR THE RIGIITS OF WOMEN 2-10 (Supp. 2(07)
[hereinafter CEDAW: UPDATED INFORMATION] (identifying additional countries that subscribed to the principles of
CEDAWand discussing effects in those that were already participants).
94 See Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
HeinOnline -- 57 Emory L.J. 54 2007-2008
54 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57
dialectical transnationalism95 enables one nation to interrogate its own
understandings of equality by comparing its rules and practices to those of
others and to talk with a diverse group of experts (selected to be representative
of different regions of the world) about what equality means in context.96
,
More than 180 countries have ratified the basic provisions of CEDAW,
albeit sometimes with reservations on particular aspects.97 President Jimmy
Carter signed CEDAW for the United States in 1980,98 but subsequent
administrations either have not succeeded or have not tried to secure Senate
ratification.99 Opposition in the United States is couched in the language of
sovereigntism. As one of the senators opposing ratification argued, to do so
Discrimination Against Women: Fifth Periodic Report of States Parties: Japan, 9, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/JPN/5 (Sept. 13, 2002). According to that report, Japan promulgated a "Basic Law for a Gender-
Equal Society" in June of 1999, and in December of 2000, the Government approved a plan to implement it,
which included the establishment of the Council for Gender Equality and the Gender Equality Bureau, within
the Cabinet Office. See id. at 12. Several laws, ranging from creating a role for women in farm management
to changing employment insurance laws, were enacted. See Id.; see also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,
Initiative on Gender and Development (GAD) (March 2005), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/
category/wid/gad.html (detailing the compliance with CEDAW and efforts to improve women's economic
status); Dr. Yoriko Meguro, Rep., Japan, 51st Sess. Commission on the Status of Women (Feb. 28, 2007),
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2oo7/un0702-6.html (describing efforts in Japan to
continue to "promote activities that contribute" to the elimination of violence against the Girl Child and
discussing Japan's Second Basic Plan for Gender Equality); see also generally Merry, supra note 91.
95 I adapt this phrase from that used by Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, in their article,
Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE LJ. 1035 (1977).
96 See generally Jennifer Nedelsky, Communities of Judgment and Human Rights, 1 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 245 (2000).
97 See Division for the Advancement of Women, United Nations, CEDAW: States Patties,
http://www.un.orglwomenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2007) (reporting 185 member-states);
see also Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALEJ.INT'LL. 307 (2006).
98 See 126 Congo Rec. 29, 358 (1980) (recording the signing on July 17, 1980; the Senate received the
Convention on November 12, 1980); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Message to the Senate Transmining the Convention, 16 WEEKLYCOMP. PREs. Doc. 2715, 2715-16 (Nov.
12,1980).
99 Resolutions to do so remain pending. See H.R. Res. 101, 110th Congo (2007) (expressing the "sense" of the
House that ''the fulJ realization of the rights of women is vital to the development and welJ-being of people of aU
nations;" and calling on the Senate to ratify CEDAW). That resolution was sponsored by ninety-six Democrats, lead
by Representative Lynn Woolsey of Califomia. See Library of Congress: Thomas, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
binlbdquerylD?dllO:101 :./list/bss/dllOHE.Ist:@@@L&summ2--rn&rrOM:/bss/IIOsearch.htmll.
In February of 2007, the Bush Administration informed the Senate that it was not supportive of ratification.
See Luisa Blanchfield, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
Congressional Research Service Repott for Congress, RL33652 (Dec. 14, 2006) at CRS-6. The position of the Bush
administration is also reported by advocates for ratification. See CEDAW: The Treaty for Women's Rights, The
Role of the United States, http://www.womenstreaty.orglfacts_USfole.htrn(last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
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would be "surrendering American domestic matters to the norm setting of the
international community."IOO
What national- or state-based norms are put at risk? At hearings before a
Senate subcommittee in 2002, one speaker explained that CEDAW posed a
threat to America's culture because it was part of a "campaign to undermine
the foundations of society-the two-parent married family, the religions that
espouse the primary importance of marriage and traditional sexual morality,
and the legal and social structures that protect these institutions." 101 Those
charges rely in part on CEDAW's call for both women and men to take
responsibility for the "upbringing and development of their children."102 From
this perspective, CEDAW' s critics have correctly identified (albeit through
provocative attacks)103 CEDAW's challenge to a conception of women as
obliged first to their households, as well as CEDAW's presumption that no
state-party (including the United States) would be immune from having to
explain to twenty-three experts what efforts were undertaken to achieve
substantive equality for women.
Further, CEDAW's opponents understand that CEDAW's aspirations
surpass the current requirements of federal constitutional law on gender
equality.l04 Included within CEDAW's call for taking "all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination" are "temporary special measures,"
aimed at accelerating substantive equality between men and women. 105 Not
only is affirmative action appropriate under CEDAW, but the definition of
what constitutes inequality differs from current American constitutional law.
100 2002 CEDAW Hearings, supra note 93, at 14-15 (statement of Sen. Michael Enzi).
101 ld. at 127 (statement of Patrick Fagan, Fellow, The Heritage Foundation); see also id. at 143 (submission by
the Family Research Council) (arguing that "CEDAW calls for an absolute leveling of every kind of distinction
between men and women at every level of society" and that it was an effort by "radical feminists" intending to
enshrine ''their radical anti-family agenda into international law"). These statements reiterate an earlier argument,
provided in a 2001 Heritage Foundation publication. See Patrick F. Fagan, How U.N. Conventions on Women's and
Children's Rights Undennine Family, Religion, and Sovereignty, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER:
ExECUTIVE SUMMARY, FEB. 5, 2001, hnpJlwww.heritage.orgIResearchllntemationalOrganizationslupI0ad/95496_I.
pdf.
102 CEDAW, supra note 5, art. 5.
103 See, e.g., Press Release, Brett Schaefer & Patrick Fagan, The Heritage Foundation, U.N. Treaty
Targets Motherhood (May 13,2(02), http://www.heritage.org!PresS/Commentary/ed051302a.cfm.
104 Opponents have argued that CEDAW is the Equal Rights Amendment "on steroids." See Press
Release, Catholic Family & Human Rights Inst., US Pro-Life/Pro-Family NGOs Flood White House
Switchboard Against CEDAW (June 7, 2002), http://www.c-fam.org/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf
=1&id=135.
105 CEDAW, supra note 5, arts. 2(e}-(t), 4. When equality is achieved, the remedial measures are to be
discontinued. ld. art. 4.
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CEDAW focuses on the purpose and effect on women of laws or actions rather
than on the intent of a particular legal rule. 106 In addition, CEDAW applies to
private as well as public actors, as CEDAW aspires to reach all aspects of
one's life, from households to labor markets to governments, from early
education to old age,I07 The conflict about ratification in the Senate is thus
based on differences about whether to support efforts aiming to alter American
equality precepts in light of understandings elsewhere about what substantive
I, 'I 108equa lty ental s.
But despite its formal authority over treaties, the Senate is not the only
arena in which that issue is being decided, and looking only to the Senate, one
would miss much of the action around CEDAW. Some 190 civic, religious,
educational, environmental, and legal organizations have built a coalition that
provides model resolutions for localities to "recognize" equal rights and to
endorse efforts to obtain U.S. ratification. I09 That work has been shaped by a
national movement, lead by the General Federation of Women's Clubs and the
Women's Institute for Leadership Development for Human Rights (WILD),
along with Amnesty International, many church groups, and other NGOs, all
encouraging states and localities to focus on CEDAW. 110
As of 2004, forty-four cities, eighteen counties, and sixteen states have
passed or considered legislation relating to CEDAW, III with yet others
106 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Humon Rights
Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 253, 259-60 (1999) (providing a comparative analysis).
107 See CEDAW, supra note 5, art. 5 (calling for modification of "social and cultural patterns of conduct
of men and women" to eliminate stereotypes); id. art. 7 (seeking women's equal participation in the
formulation of government policy and equal employment possibilities); id. art. 16 (eliminating discrimination
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations).
108 The idea that United States law might take in as well as export constitutional precepts was identified
by Anthony Lester, as he asked "Is America listening?" and urged the importance of this form of ''trade:' See
Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill ofRights, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 558--61 (1988).
109 SeeCEDAW: 1HETREATYFOR THE RIGfITS OF WOMEN, supra note 93, at 16-17,67-72.
110 The National Committee on the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, chaired by Billie Heller, was formed, and a manual drafted. See ROBIN LEVI, LocAL IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE UN CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRlMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (CEDAW)
(Krishanti Dharmaraj ed., 1999), available at http://www.wildforhumanrights.orglpdfslcedawlocalimplement.pdf.
Included in the materials distributed was a model version, proposed by the Working Group on Ratification of
CEDAW, for localities to adopt.
III CEDAW: THE TREATY FOR THE RIGfITS OF WOMEN, supra note 93, at 73-74. Iowa City was the first
to adopt such a resolution, doing so on August I, 1995. See City Council, Res. 95-222 (Iowa City, Iowa Aug.
12, 1995); see also Telephone Interview with Billie Heller, Chair, Comm. for Ratification of CEDAW (July 8,
2005); Telephone Interview with Ellen Dorsey, Board Member, Amnesty InCI (Feb. 23, 2006). In addition,
efforts were made to use "international law ... as universal norms and to serve as guides for public policy"
there. City Council, Res. 95-222 (Iowa City, Iowa Aug. 12, 1995); see CEDAW: THE TREATY FOR THE
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contemplating action. Many localities responded with expressive, hortatory
provisions, calling for the United States to ratify CEDAW. Some local
adaptations do so by proudly identifying this transnational effort with their
particularly American heritage. 1l2 Like the City of Philadelphia's Resolution
RIGHTS OF WOMEN. supra note 93. at 73-74. Many municipalities' resolutions are not in databases, but to
enable access to some of these materials, those cited in this footnote are on file with the Yale Law Library.
Localities on record with resolutions supporting United States ratification of CEDAWand/or its
underlying principles include (grouped alphabetically by state): Bd. of Supervisors, Res. 991551 (Contra Costa
County, Cal. Oct. 26, 1999); City Council, Res. The Los Angeles Commission on the Status of Women (L.A.,
Cal. Mar. 15,2(00); City Council, Proclamation: Convention in Support of Women's Rights (Redlands, Cal.
Jan. 19, 1999); Mayor & Common Council, Res. 2000-50 (San Bernardino, Cal. Mar. 8, 2(00); City Council,
Res. R-98-964 (San Diego, Cal. Mar. 17, 1998); City Council, Res. No. 68921 (San Jose, Cal. June 15, 1999);
Committee on Human Relations, United States Senate Urged To Ratify "Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women" (Chi., 111. May 12, 1999); City Council, Res. 4 I-R-97 (Evanston,
111. Aug. 18,1997); City Council, Res. RIO-99 (Highland Park, III. Aug. 9,1999); City Council, Order No. 242
(Portland, Me. March 15, 1999); Council Chamber, Res. 99-28 (Berea, Ohio June 7,1999); City Council, Res.
69-1999 (Cleveland Heights, Ohio May 17, 1999); City Council, Res. 2000-46 (Mayfield Heights, Ohio June
13,2000); City Council, Res. 1999-71 (Middleburg Heights, Ohio June 24, 1999); City Council, Res. 1999-141
(Strongsville, Ohio July 6, 1999); City Council, Res. 980148 (Phila., Pa. Mar. 12, 1998); City Council, Res.
Supporting the Ratification or Accession by the United States to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Pittsburgh, Pa. Apr. 29, 1997); City Council, Res. Relating to the
Adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (Burlington, VI. Apr. 28, 1997); City Council, Resolution Endorsing the United Nations Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Montpelier, VI. Feb. 26, 1997); City
Council, Res. 00-4 (Spokane, Wash. Jan. 24, 2000); City Council, Res. 7050 (Fond du Lac, Wis. Sept. 22,
1999); Mayor & Common Council, Res. 26625 (Madison, Wis. Nov. 30, 1999); Common Council, Res.
Recognizing the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (Milwaukee, Wis. July 7,1998).
Several states have introduced or passed resolutions calling for ratification. Included are: SJ. Res. 30,
1992 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 1992) (introduced); H. Con. Res. 23, 140th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess.
(Del. 1999) (introduced); H. Res. 351, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2003) (introduced); H. Con. Res.
15., 20th Leg. (Haw. 1999) (passed both houses); S. Res. 0437 & H. Res. 0739, 94th Gen. Assemb. (III. 2004)
(passed both houses-the Illinois House of Representatives had adopted a CEDAW-supportive resolution
more than a decade earlier as well, see H. Res. 1399, 87th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 1992)); S. Con. Res. 14, 74th
Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 1991) (passed both houses); Res. Relating to the Ratification of the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, l77th Gen. Court (Mass.
1991) (passed both houses); H. Con. Res. 12,1997 Reg. Sess. (N.H. 1998) (passed both houses); H. Res. 1416,
216th Gen. Assemb. (N.Y. 1993) (passed House); H. Res. 388,1999-2000 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 1999) (passed
House); S. Con. Res. 10, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2003) (introduced); H. Res. 144, 187th Gen. Assemb.,
2003-04 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003) (passed House); H. Res. 7100, 2000 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.1. 2000)
(passed House); H. Con. Res. 1006, 68th Leg. Sess. (S.D. 1993) (passed both houses); SJ. Res. 16, 64th Leg.
Sess. (VI. 1997) (passed both houses); SJ. Mem. 8008, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1999) (introduced); SJ.
Res. 37, 94th Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1999) (introduced). The Territory of Guam also issued a proclamation
endorsing ratification. Proclamation No. 98-37, Territory of Guam (Apr. 23, 1998).
According to the 2007 CEDAW update, since 2004 three more cities, one more county, and two more
states had supported CEDAW in votes of local councils or one or both houses of their legislatures. See
CEDAW: UPDATED INFORMATION, supra note 93, at 5-6.
112 See. e.g., H. Con. Res. 23, 140th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Del. 1999) (calling for ratification and citing
America as a "leading advocate for human rights").
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quoted at the outset of this section, many underscore the "importance of
international law in our own communities as a universal norm and to serve as
guides for public policy." I 13 Further, some such as Burlington, Vermont, link
this effort to those begun in the 1950s that connected cities through a "Sister
Cities" program. Noting "the greatly increased interdependence of the people
of the world," the Burlington Resolution insisted that its "responsibilities"
extended "beyond the boundaries of our city, state, and nation, as demonstrated
through [the] Sister Cities Program." I 14
Some resolutions go beyond expressive statements calling for ratification
and take a different tack by turning "transnational" law into "local" law.
While the United States has not ratified CEDAW, San Francisco has enacted
some of its precepts by obliging itself to deploy the CEDAW techniques of
lawmaking through self-interrogation about the effects of equality norms
across all of its domains. As illustrated by the opening quote from San
Francisco's Resolution, the City now requires reports on the role women play
in departments responsible for public works, adult probation, arts,
environment, and juvenile probation. I15 In a 2003 action plan,116 the City
committed to reviewing federal, state, and local laws and public policies to
identify systematic and structural discrimination against women and girls so as
to "[i]ntegrate gender into every city department to achieve full equality for
men and women through the city-wide budgeting process," as well as to
undertake a host of other measures, from changing work-life policies to
increasing protection for women's "bodily integrity," safety, and "well-
being.,,117 In 2007, San Francisco released a report which noted that its work
had drawn the attention of the National Association of Counties (NACO), "the
113 City Council, Res. 980148 (Phila., Pa. Mar. 12, 1998).
114 City Council, Res. Relating to the Adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of
All Fonus of Discrimination Against Women (Burlington, VI. Apr. 28, 1997).
liS See S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12K.1--6 (2005). Information and reports are available at SFGov,
http://www.sfgov.orglsiteldosw_index.asp (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). In April of 2007, the Department on the
Status of Women issued its Gender Analysis Report. See generally Martha F. Davis, International Human Rights
from the Ground Up: The Potential for Subnational, Human Rights-Based Reproductive Health Advocacy in the
United States, in WHERE HUMAN RIGIITS BEGIN: HEALTH, SEXUALITY AND WOMEN IN THE NEW MtLLENNIUM
235 (Wendy Chavkin & Ellen Chesler eds., 2005).
116 See SAN FRANCISCO COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, CEDAwArnON Pi..AN (2003), available at
http://www.sfgov.orglsitelcosw-page.asp?id=17146.
117 Id.
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only national organization that represents county governments," which
commended the work upholding "the human rights of women and girlS.,,118
These goals have a name in transnational parlance; they are what the
United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the Commonwealth Secretariat call
gender mainstreaming, aimed at ensuring that all social policy decisions are
made with attention to their effects on women and men. 119 The spread of that
approach comes in part through transnational efforts, promoted by the United
Nations, to bring attention to women into focus. That work has succeeded, if
success is measured by the creation of new "national machineries for the
advancement of women," of which one hundred were created between 1975
and 1997.120
Returning to the United States, efforts akin to those of San Francisco are
underway in Los Angeles, which, in 2003, enacted an ordinance
acknowledging the "continuing need ... to protect the human rights of women
and girls by addressing discrimination, including violence, against them and to
implement, locally, the principles of CEDAW.,,121 Los Angeles launched
"gender analyses, to determine what, if any, City practices and policies" could
be improved. 122 Moving east, in the spring of 2005, the New York City
Council considered an ordinance that would bring aspects of CEDAWand the
118 See CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, DEP'T ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN,.GENDER ANALYSIS
REPORT at 17 (Apr. 2007), http://www.sfgov.orglsiteluploadedfiles/dosw/programslCEDAW/Gender_
Analysis_Repons/repons/Final%20DOSW~ender_analysis_final_report_031307.doc.
119 See Secretary-General, Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of the Beijing Plat/ann for Action,
'Il'll11-15, U.N. Doc. ElCN.612ooolPC12 (Jan. 19, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/
ecn6-2ooo-pc2.pdf (discussing the United Nation's commitment to this approach); see also CHRISTINE CHINKlN,
GENDER MAiNSTREAMING IN LEGAL AND CONSTITUIlONAL AFFAIRS: A REFERENCE MANUAL FOR GOVERNMENTS
AND OrnER STAKEHOLDERS (2001); GROUP OF SPECIALISTS ON MAiNSTREAMING, COUNCIL OF EUR., GENDER
MAiNSTREAMING: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEwORK, METHODOLOGY AND PREsENTATION OF GOOD PRACTICE 4-5 (1998).
This approach is not without its critics. See Hilary Charlesworth, Not Waving but Drowning: Gender
Mainstreaming and Human Rights in the United Nations, 18 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. I (2005) (arguing that the
dominant methods of gender mainstreaming substitute bland approaches that deflect attention from inequality).
120 See Jacqui True & Michael Mintrom, Transnational Networks and Policy Diffusion: The Case of
Gender Mainstreaming, 45 INT'L STUDIES Q. 27, 30 (2001).
121 L.A., CAL., ORDINANCE 175735 (Dec. 24, 2003), available at http://clkrep.lacity.orgtcouncilfilesloo-D398-
S2_0RD_175735_02-D8-2004.pdf. Like CEDAW, the city's definition of gender discrimination seeks to respond
to the challenges of combining parental obligations with "work responsibilities and participation in public life." Id.
122 Id. Berkeley has a resolution putting its Board of Supervisors on record as supporting "local
implementation of the underlying principles" of CEDAW. City Counsel, Res. 62,617 (Berkeley, Cal. July 20,
20(4).
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Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) into the local
I . 123aw regIme.
C. Transloeal-Transnational Environmentalism: Kyoto and Beyond
"[T]he sovereign right [of nations] to exploit their own resources" is
stated along with a commitment to protect the "natural resources of the
earth ... for the benefit of present and future generations," and "the
responsibility to ensure that activities within our jurisdiction ... do not
cause damage" to the environment.
Declaration ofthe United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, Stockholm (1972)124
The Mayors of cities in the United States develop their Program to
"meet or exceed the Kyoto Protocol targets ... in their own operations
and communities," encouragement of federal and state governments to
meet Kyoto targets, and commendations to Congress to pass bipartisan
legislation to create an emissions trading system.
The U.S. Mayors' Climate Protection Agreement (2005)125
To focus on international human rights alone would be to obscure how
varied translocal transnational work is. On topics ranging from economic
development and immigration to land mines, local activists seek to alter
policies both near and far. My example here is environmental regulation, for
which the 1972 Stockholm Conference, resulting in the Stockholm
Declaration, is a touchstone. 126 As in the U.N. Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, this Declaration includes recognition of both
transnational concerns and the interests of individual nations. "[T]he sovereign
right [of nations] to exploit their own resources,,127 is stated along with a
123 A CEDAW/CERD initiative was introduced in December of 2004. See Intro 512-Human Rights GOAL:
Hearing Before the Governmental Operations Comm., N.Y. City Council (Apr. 8, 2(05) (statement of Emily M.
Murase), available at http://www.nychri.orgldocumentsIMurase.pdf(discussing the proposed initiative). As of the
spring of 2007, the 2004 bill had not been enacted and another was to be reintroduced. E-mail from Ejim Dike to
Judith Resnik (May 9, 2007) (on file with author); see also Gen. Assemb. Res. 144, 183rd Leg. (pa. 2003) (calling
for hearings on how to review its laws to integrate "human rights standards").
124 See U.N. Conference on the Human Env't, June 5-16, 1972, Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. NCONF. 48/14, princs. 2, 21 (June 16, 1972) [hereinafter
U.N. Conference on the Environment].
125 See U.S. Conference of Mayors, Endorsing the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement (2005),
available at http://usmayors.orgluscmlresolutions/73rd30nferencelen_OI.asp.
126 See U.N. Conference on the Environment, supra note 124.
127 Id. prine. 21.
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commitment to protect the "natural resources of the earth ... for the benefit of
present and future generations.,,128 Such provisions are common in their
insistence on the coexistence and interdependency of national and transnational
action.
In December of 1997, a group of nations came together in Kyoto, Japan, to
address global warming. Their agreement, called the Kyoto Protocol, created a
framework, relying on certain timetables, to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. 129 In 1998, President William J. Clinton signed the Protocol. 130
But, like the conflict over CEDAW, opposition to participation by the United
States was nested in claims about how doing so would undermine the
sovereignty of the United States. In the same year that President Clinton
signed the Protocol, the Committee to Preserve American Security and
Sovereignty (COMPASS), comprised of a group of former government
officials who were mostly affiliated with Republican administrations and
apparently functioning together specifically to oppose the Kyoto Protocol,
issued its report whicp is called Treaties, National Sovereignty, and Executive
Power: A Report on the Kyoto Protocol. 131
COMPASS objected to the treaty as wrongly imposing limits on the United
States as a sovereign. 132 Further, the report argued that the Protocol attempted
to "convert decisions usually classified as 'domestic' for purposes of U.S. law
and politics into 'foreign,',,133 thus limiting the powers of Congress, local
governments, and private entities. In addition, COMPASS charged that Kyoto
opened the door to the use of courts, empowered through customary
international law, to create a new "super-national source of binding legal
ruleS.,,134 Consistent with sovereigntists' reliance on themes of democratic
processes, COMPASS complained that the Kyoto Protocol emerged through
the influence of NGOs which were "not politically accountable.,,135 These
arguments resonated with George W. Bush who, in 2001, withdrew American
128 Id. prine. 2.
129 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 6; see also generally Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework
Convention on Climnte Change: A Commentary, 18 YALEJ. iNr'L L. 451 (1993); Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimnl
Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495, 1535-38 (1999).
130 Kyolo Protocol, supra note 6.
131 COMM. To PRESERVE AM. SEC. & SOVEREIGNTY, TREATIES, NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, AND
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support of the Kyoto Protocol. I36 About four years later, in February of 2005,
the Kyoto Protocol went into effect with a group of 141 countries that had
ratified it. 137 But as is the case with CEDAW, one must look beyond the
Senate to understand the relationship between the United States and efforts to
stem global warming.
Many local officials in the United States do not share President Bush's
views regarding the Kyoto Protocol. Several cities, including Seattle and Salt
Lake City, have enacted ordinances aimed at conforming to the Protocol's
targets for controlling local utility emissions. In March 2005, a small group of
mayors agreed to their own climate protection program, 138 which was approved
by the United States Conference of Mayors in June 2005. By the fall of 2007,
more than 700 mayors, representing towns and cities with combined
populations of over sixty-seven million people, endorsed that program, 139
which includes efforts to "meet or beat the Kyoto Protocol targets in their own
communities,,,140 encouragement of federal and state governments to meet
Kyoto targets, and commendations to Congress to pass bipartisan legislation to
.. d' 141create an ermsslOns tra mg system.
In addition, and again paralleling the local work on CEDAW, some
localities have enacted expressive resolutions calling for national action. For
example, in 2007, of "234 incorporated cities and towns in New Hampshire,"
180 voted on whether "to support a resolution asking the federal government to
address climate change" and to call "for state residents to approve local
solutions for combating climate change." 142 As of March of 2007, 134 had
passed such initiatives. 143
136 See, Contemporary Practice of the United States Related to International Law, U.S. Rejection of Kyoto
Protocol Process, 95 AM. J.INT'L L. 647,647-49 (2001); Remarks on Global Climate Change, 1PuB. PAPERS 634,
634 (2001) (offering as an explanation that "[t]he Kyoto Protocol was fatally flawed" because relevant scientific
information was lacking and that exemptions for certain countries underntined the agreement).
137 See U.S. Conference of Mayors, Endorsing the U.s. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement (2005),
available at http://usmayors.orgfuscrnlresolutionsf73nCconferencelen_OI.asp.
138 Office of the Mayor of Seattle, Wash., Homepage for the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement,
http://www.seattle.gov/mayorlclimate [hereinafter Mayors Agreement] (last visited Nov. 4, 2(07).
139 The U.S. Conference of Mayors Website, http://usmayors.orgfuscrnlhome.asp(last visited Nov. 4, 2(07).
140 Mayors Agreement, supra note 138.
141 See itt.
142 Katie Zezima, In New Hampshire, Towns Put Climate on the Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19,2007, at
AS.
143 Id.
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m. REGULATING THE lMpORTIEXPORT TRADE OF LAW
In interpreting and applying the Constitution of the United States, a
court of the United States may not rely on any constitution, law,
administrative rule, Executive order, directive, policy, judicial decision,
or any other action of any foreign state or international organization or
agency, other than the constitutional law and English common law up to
the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United States.
63
Constitutional Restoration Act of2005144
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, any State may adopt
measures to prohibit any investment of State assets in the Government
of Sudan or in any company with a qualifying business relationship with
Sudan ....
Sudan Divestment Authorization Act of2007145
A. Laissez Faire or Regulated Internationalism?
As the multiple ports of entry created through the federated structure of the
United States come into view, one must learn not to equate "the foreign" with
democratic deficits because democratic iterations are a regular route by which
"the foreign" becomes domestic. This process helps to clarify that
sovereigntists opposed to "foreign" law are putting forth a political position
distinct from theories grounded in the democratic practices of federalism.
Neither premises intrinsic to democracy nor to federalism dictate when and
how American law should borrow from abroad. Rather, democratic federalism
is, repeatedly, a source of importation that has transformed the nation's self-
understanding of its own legal comrnitments. 146
Through this overview of facets of horizontal federalism's translocal
internationalism, one can see that, as a political theory, sovereigntism has no
special relationship to majoritarianism. Sometimes, sovereigntist positions win
popular initiatives to try to erect formal boundaries, and other times, such
attempts fail. As a practice, sovereigntists have a dismal track record in that
144 S. 520. 100th Congo § 201 (2005).
145 S. 831. I 10th Congo § 5 (2007).
146 Thus, I do not share the view that one can make a general claim that the "popular culture" of America
is "hostile" to relying on "foreign" law to shape understandings of our constitutional precepts or that justices
on the Supreme Coun are far removed from cultural trends. Cf Stephen G. Calabresi. "A Shining City on a
Hill": American Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court's Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 S.U. L.
REV. 1335, 1410-14 (2006).
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American law is constantly being made and remade through exchanges, some
frank and some implicit, with normative views from abroad. Laws, like
people, migrate. Legal borders, like physical ones, are permeable, and seepage
is everywhere.
But once sovereigntism is untangled from majoritarianism and federalism,
a core premise of an exclusivist sovereigntism-that a nation-state's law ought
to aspire, self-consciously, to be contained or to channel its relationships with
other nations through certain specified routes-can be evaluated on its own
terms (in isolation if you will). To argue that sovereigntism cannot succeed as
a practice ought not lead one to ignore the important questions raised through a
sovereigntist stance-to wit: (I) whether this trade in the import and export of
law ought to be regulated by law and, if so by national actors, such as
Congress, the courts, the Executive, or agencies; (2) whether in doing so,
national actors (be they executive, legislative, or judicial) should be specially
privileged as the principal agents of trade; and (3) whether judge-to-judge
transfers are distinctive, and if so, distinctively in need of regulation.
A second purpose of this Article is thus to invite engagement with the
questions raised by sovereigntists. To do so requires considering whether the
issues are to be decided by reference to the Constitution. Does any branch of
government hold the constitutional power to try to discourage certain actors
from importing or exporting law? If the Constitution is silent, how should a
democratic nation-state decide how much to welcome, facilitate, or chill
comparative legal excursions by any of the government's branches? And what
is the relationship of these questions to the identity formation of a nation-state,
to decisions about what its normative commitments will be, and about how it
will provide services and enforce laws for those who reside within it? How
might democratic federalists, attentive to majoritarianism yet mindful of rights-
protection through courts, reason about the trade in law? Should non-
sovereigntists be concerned about the potential for the national boundaries to
erode as local entrepreneurs shape initiatives across an array of issues? Ought
one worry that the policies made will be unworkable in practice or do
systematic harm to certain interests?
The stakes in forming answers to these questions are significant. As
localities and states expand the reach and range of their interactions to engage
in a robust multi-faceted discourse with localities and nations abroad, they do
compete with and lessen the hegemony of the national government. Moreover,
to the extent that sovereigntists succeed in conflating challenges to judicial
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review with objections to the use of foreign legal premises, additional pressure
is placed on judicial independence. 147
Categorization of the kind of questions now on the table is in order. One
set falls within the purview of legal doctrine, such as whether as a matter of
constitutional law, or of constitutional common law, or statutory interpretation,
federal or state judges, as well as federal or state legislators, are authorized to
or disabled from interacting across borders in certain ways. Undergirding that
interpretative process are questions of separation of powers and judicial role as
well as questions about the degree to which states ought to be centers of robust
authority and potential sites of experimentation and variation.
Another set of issues (often associated with the terrain of political scientists
and sociologists) is about institutional competency, efficacy, efficiency, and
utility. As a matter of policy and practice, how are wise decisions forged,
commitments made, changed, or reaffirmed? Ought one have a preference that
multiple forms of engagement are desirable or that operating as a nation with
"one voice" is a better modality, and if so, for whom-those within this
country or humankind more generally? Were one a utilitarian, are certain
forms of organization better than others to generate policies maximizing social
welfare? And what role do commitments to democratic practices play in
responding to these questions?
For American constitutional lawyers, a starting point is the allocation of
authority. For example, the issue of whether legislators ought to direct judges
to limit their use of source materials-by banning citation of "foreign" law or
for that matter forbidding the use of law reviews or Wikipedia-is a problem
about separation of powers. Similarly, the ability of a court to strike state
provisions regulating foreign corporations depends on one's views on judicial
review, on the scope of national government powers and the respective roles of
Congress, the President, and agencies, on the definition of "foreign affairs,"
and on the degree of deference to be accorded state and local officials in this
federation. For liberal political theorists and moral philosophers, these
questions require consideration of which interpretations of a constitutional
scheme will enable reflections of majoritarian will, tempered with protection of
human rights and the enhancement of the values of transparency and
accountability. For those focused on policy and good governance, these
147 Some are more sanguine than others about the durability of jUdicial authority. See, e.g., Judith Resnik,
Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1101 (2006).
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questions may tum on the practicality and feasibility of multiple layers and
sources of rules.
B. Congressional Constraints on Judicial Importation
One kind of sovereigntist barrier is an effort to limit the ability of courts to
tum to non-United States sources of law. Discussed below are two techniques
to do so, one through legislation and the other by generating norms through
pu.blic inquiries made of proposed nominees to the courts.
In terms of legislation, proposals like the Constitutional Restoration Act of
2005, quoted at the outset of this section, have been put into the hopper and
produced hearings on the question of limiting judges' use of non-United States
law. After Democrats gained a measure of authority in Congress in the 2006
election, activity related to the Constitutional Restoration Act stalled.
Nonetheless, provisions within the Military Commissions Act of 2006 do
impose limits on the use of "foreign sources" when judges interpret United
States' obligations under certain provisions of the Geneva Convention. 148
Moreover, like the "ghost of Senator Bricker" (to borrow Louis Henkin's
phrase describing the impact of the 1950s proposal by that senator to amend
the United States Constitution to prevent international treaties from affecting
domestic obligations149), these congressional bills have, in conjunction with
other events, had an effect.
The change in the membership of the Supreme Court after the death of
Chief Justice Rehnquist and the resignation of Justice O'Connor shifted
attention away from the issue of "foreign" law to the durability of "domestic"
doctrines in a variety of arenas, including such high-visibility questions as the
148 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub\. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified in scattered
sections of titles 10, 18, and 28 of the United States Code). One provision within that act provides that "[n]o
foreign or international source of law shall supply a basis for a rule of decision in the courts of the United
States" when those courts interpret the country's obligations to comply with the Third Geneva Convention to
provide "effective penal sanctions for grave breaches which are encompassed in common Article 3 in the
context of an armed conflict not of an international character." 120 Stat. 2632, 18 U.S.c. § 2441. Section 5(a)
of the MCA further states that "[n]o person may invoke the Geneva Conventions or any protocols thereto in
any habeas corpus or other civil action or proceeding to which the United States, or a current or former officer,
employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States is a party as a source of rights in
any court of the United States or its States or its territories." 120 Stat. 2631, 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Section 948b
provides that "[n]o alien unlawful enemy combatant subject to trial by military commission ... may invoke the
Geneva Conventions as a source of rights." 120 Stat. 2602,10 U.S.c. § 948b.
149 Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification ofHuman Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM.
J.INT'I. L. 341 (1995).
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legality of affirmative action and of restrictions on abortions. 150 Moreover,
while Chief Justice Rehnquist had expressed some support for international
exchanges (and created a committee on the Judicial Conference of the United
States to facilitate that activity),151 his successor, Chief Justice John Roberts,
testified in his confirmation hearings that he thought it wrong to tum to
"foreign" law.
The question about the use of "foreign" law came from Senator Jon Kyl of
Arizona. Senator Kyl stated his concern that "[o]ur Constitution was drafted
by the Nation's Founders" and ratified through "constitutional processes that
involve both Federal and State legislators," and was at risk of being
"determined by reference to foreign law.,,152 He then asked the nominee:
"[w]hat, if anything, is the proper role of foreign law in U.S. Supreme Court
decisions? ... [in] cases such as those that would involve interpretations of the
U.S. Constitution?,,153
Then-Judge Roberts replied that, "as a general matter ... [there are] a
couple of things that cause concern on my part about the use of foreign law as
precedent ,,154 His first concern was about "democratic theory," that
"judges are not accountable to the people," and that borrowing law from
150 For example, in Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 U.S. 1610 (2007), the Court ruled 5-4 that a federal statute
that banned partial birth abortions but provided no express exception for a woman's health or reproductive
safety was constitutional. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion over a dissent penned by Justice
Ginsburg and joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer.
lSI See William H. Rehnquist, Foreword to DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, at vii, viii (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2(02) (reprinting remarks made in 1999). Further,
the Chief Justice chaired the Judicial Conference of the United States when, in 1993, it established the
Standing Committee on International Judicial Relations of the Judicial Conference of the United States. See
Michael M. Mihm, International Judicial Relations Committee Promotes Communication, Coordination, I
INT'L JUD. OBSERVER I (I 995). In 2006, the federal judiciary provided "briefings for 53 international
delegations, including 460 judges, court administrators, and other officials from 6O-plus countries." ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REpORT 2006 19, available at http://www.uscourts.govllibrary/
annualreports/200612006_annualreport.pdf.
152 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, S. Hrg. 109-158, 109th Congo 200 (2005) [hereinafter
Roberts Hearing]. Senator Kyl stated that something had "been bugging" him; that the Court in Roper V.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), had "not only, in [his] view, engaged in questionable analysis of American
law, it spent perhaps 20 percent of its legal analysis discussing the laws of Great Britain, Saudi Arabia,
Yemen, Iran, Pakistan, Nigeria and China." Senator Kyl found the "trend" toward attentiveness to the laws of
other nations "greatly troubling" and continued: "It's an American Constitution, not a European or an African
or an Asian one. And its meaning, it seems to me, by definition, cannot be determined by reference to foreign
law." !d. at 199-200. See also Mark Tushnet, When is Knowing Less Better than Knowing More? Unpacking
the Controversy over Supreme Court Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2006).
153 Roberts Hearing, supra note 152, at 200.
154 !d.
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another country would be to give jurists from that country "a role in shaping a
law that binds the people in this country.,,155 Further, the nominee stated his
view that "foreign precedent doesn't confine judges," but rather "[i]t allows the
judge to incorporate his or her own personal preferences, cloak them in the
authority of precedent-because they're finding precedent in foreign law, and
use that to determine the meaning of the Constitution.,,156
A few months thereafter, Samuel Alito appeared before the Senate at his
confirmation hearings to become an Associate Justice. 157 The nominee also
rejected a robust role for "foreign" law as he explained it was not "helpful in
interpreting the Constitution" because the structure of the United States
government was "unique," with "our own traditions" and "our own
precedents.,,158 Thereafter, Justice Alito replaced Justice O'Connor, who has
been one of the leading spokespersons for learning from abroad through a
process she termed "transjudicialism.,,159
The exchanges at the hearings of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito fit
within a tradition of using confirmation hearings as a venue to develop legal
norms. The transcripts of hearings provide windows into the constitutional
culture of a particular moment, as lines of questions highlight issues that are
salient or contested. The debate about the use of "foreign" law is of relatively
recent vintage, as can be seen by contrasting the hearings on Roberts and Alito
with earlier confirmation discussions in which parallel questions were not
posed. Scanning the transcripts of the confirmation hearings of Justices
Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer,160 one cannot find such
ISS Id. at 200-01.
156 /d. at 201. When pressed in subsequent questioning by Senator Tom Coburn, then-Judge Roberts
disagreed with the proposition that judges who cited foreign law were "violating their oath" of office. Id. at
293. While they might be "getting it wrong" they would presumably be "operating in good faith." Id. For a
discussion of why considering non-binding foreign law is not arbitrary, see H. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive
Authority, 32 MCGILL L.J. 261, 264-90 (1987).
157 C.onfinnation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alita, Jr. to be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S.. Comm. on the Judiciary, S. Hrg. 109-277, 109th
Congo (2006) [hereinafter Alito Hearing]. Again, Senator Kyl asked the question, prefacing it with his view
that "reliance on foreign law is contrary to our constitutional traditions," "undermines democratic self-
government;" is "utterly impractical" and "needlessly disrespectful of the American people." Id. at 370.
158 Id.
159 See Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks at the 79th Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute (May
15,2002) in 79 A.L.1. PROC. 245, 247-49 (2002).
160 To search for this issue, we looked for the terms "foreign law" and "international law" in the
transcripts. Statements during Justice Ginsburg's confirmation hearings did refer approvingly to her expertise
in international and comparative law. See Confinnation Hearing on the Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg
to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the
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inquiries. Elsewhere, I detailed a comparable shift in questioning, as the issue
of a nominee's attitude toward women's rights made its way during the 1970s
and 1980s into the confirmation process. 161 The question of a nominee's views
of the constitutional protections afforded to women moved from the periphery
to becoming important when the nomination of Robert Bork was before the
Senate. The exchanges in the last few years on "foreign" law substantiate the
point that nomination hearings are a place to debate and to develop norms, as
well as to expose what questions appear settled and not appropriately
contested. Further evidence of the use of hearings for those purposes comes
from the fact that both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito were asked
questions about their views on women's rights. 162
In analyzing the development of senatorial interest in nominees' attitudes
towards women's rights, I argued that senators, who are constitutionally
obliged to give advice and consent to a nomination, were appropriately
gathering information about nominees' views on matters of import and
simultaneously speaking to their own constituencies and to judges in general
about their aspirations for what America's law entailed. And, of course,
senators were looking to find nominees whose views accorded with their own.
Questioning nominees is a permissible vehicle to develop or to contest norms.
In contrast, proposed bills such as the Constitutional Restoration Act of
2005 directing judges not to "rely" on "foreign" law cross the line from
expressive efforts to unwise (and arguably impermissible) congressional
oversight of judicial decisionmaking. My objection does not lie only in the
Judiciary, S. Hrg. 103-482, 103d Congo 553 (1993) (Statement of Carlos G. Ortiz, Hispanic National Bar
Association) (praising then-Judge Ginsburg's comparative law scholarship and background). But neither those
hearings nor those of Justices Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, or Breyer included questions focused on "foreign"
law as were addressed to then-Judges Roberts and Alito. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of
Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice ofthe Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, S. Hrg. 100-1037, 100th Congo (1987); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of
David H. Souter to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, S. Hrg. 101-1263, IOlst Congo (1990); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of
Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, S. Hrg. 102-1084, 102d Congo (1991); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of
Stephen G. Breyer to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, S. Hrg. 103-715, 103d Congo (1994). Full transcripts of all of these confirmation
hearings are available at http://www.gpoaccess.govlcongresslsenateljudiciary/scourt.html.
161 Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26
CARDOW L. REV. 579, 631-36 (2005).
162 See Roberts Hearing, supra note 152, at 310-12. Further, several women testified that the nominee
was respectful of women as employees and supportive of their careers. See, e.g., id,at 476-77 (statement of
Maureen Mahoney); see also Alito Hearing, supra note 157, at 384-85.
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prohibition on "foreign" law, for I would find it equally offensive for Congress
to direct judges not to consider or cite law reviews or Wikipedia. Such
provisions are ill-advised because judges in a democracy ought to explain in
detail the processes, facts, norms, law, legal arguments, and sources that
brought them to the legal judgments rendered. 163 Further, American judges
have much to learn from foreign jurists-in particular because they also
struggle to give meaning to obligations that parallel some of those found in the
United States Constitution. How to use those insights is complex, but the risk
of misuse of information and precedent exists throughout the enterprise of
judging. Yet, as I have explained elsewhere, I can both imagine and endorse
judges who decide that, because their core premises emerge from the American
legal tradition, forays abroad to citations from other legal systems would
distract the litigants and the readership more broadly from the core principles
they are explicating as intrinsic to the law of the United States. l64
The 2005 Constitutional Restoration Act, worded as a directive followed by
a threat of impeachment, is not only unwise but ought also to be understood as
unconstitutional. 165 Those familiar with federal legislation relating to courts
know well the many statutes that direct judges on what factors to consider
when determining liability, on what remedies to prefer, in which order, and
when. But many of these statutes have escape clauses, prioritizing but not
prohibiting specific decisions. 166 In contrast, a statute that seeks both to
control the sources of judicial interpretation and to sanction judges for
163 See Jeremy Waldron, "Partly Laws Common to All Mankind": Foreign Law in American Courts,
Storrs Lectures at the Yale Law School (Sept. 10-12, 2007) (on file with author).
164 See Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's
Multiple Ports ofEntry, 115 YALE LJ. 1564, 1612-26 (2006) [hereinafter Resnik, Law's Migration].
165 See Appropriate Role ofForeign Judgments in the Interpretation ofAmerican Law: Hearing before the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Congo 33-40 (2004) (statement of Vicki. C. Jackson, Prof. of Law,
Georgetown U. L. Center), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/cornmitteesljudiciarylhju92673.000/
hju92673_0f.htm. Whether Justice Scalia's objection to the provision sounds in constitutional or policy terms
is not clear from newspaper reports of his discussion, but apparently after stating that "no one is more opposed
to the use of foreign law than I am," he also thought that it was not "up to Congress to direct the court how to
make its decisions." Charles Lane, Scalia Tells Congress to Mind Its Own Business, WASH. POST, May 19,
2006, at A19.
166 See, e.g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) (upholding aspects of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act); Lauf V. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 327-28 (1938) (upholding aspects of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act); see a/so Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.c. § 1341 (2006) (prohibiting federal courts from enjoining state tax
assessments or collections as long as a "plain, speedy and efficient remedy" is available in state court); Anti-
Injunction Act, 28 U.S.c. § 2283 (2006) (prohibiting federal courts from enjoining pending litigation in state
courts absent specified exceptions).
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violating that mandate violates the judiciary's protected independence and
potentially litigants' due process right. 167
C. Judicial Constraints on Importation: Protecting the Executive from Local
Decisionmaking
If one expression of sovereigntism is an effort by some members of
Congress to control judges, another is the judicial imposition of limits on the
role of localities in relation to issues placed under the umbrella of "the
foreign." This issue is now on the litigation front-burner as the Supreme Court
has, over the last decade, developed a doctrine called foreign affairs
preemption. The Court has used this doctrine to prohibit the State of
Massachusetts from banning its own expenditures on imports made with forced
labor,168 and the Court relied on this principle when invalidating a California
statute that required companies offering insurance to disclose their dealings
during the Holocaust. 169 The underlying idea is that state decisions could
affect foreign affairs in a way detrimental to the national interest, and that the
country is presumptively better off when its interactions with other countries
come from a unitary source exercising "one voice"-that of the executive
speaking for the national government.
The many scenarios in which this doctrine has been deployed render the
nomenclature of "foreign affairs preemption" insufficient, such that judges at
times rely on or create doctrines that could be termed "war powers
preemption,,,170 or "foreign commerce preemption,,,171 or "political question
preemption.,,172 Further, the phrase "foreign affairs preemption" entails a legal
puzzle, in that preemption is a term often used when afederal statute precludes
167 See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 128 (1872).
168 Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
169 Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
170 See, e.g., Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 317 F.3d 1005, amended and superseded on denial of reh'g en
bane, 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003).
171 See, e.g., Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, Inc. v. Giannoulias 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13341 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 23, 2007). For the interaction among genres of preemption law, see Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth
Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, Nos. 2:05-CV-302, 2:05-CV-304, 2007 WL 2669444, at *85-90 (D. Vt. Sept. 12,
2007); Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160, I175-87 (E.D. Cal. 2006); Cent.
Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3002 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12,2007).
172 See, e.g, Deutsch v. Turner Corp., No. CV 00-4405 SVW(AJWX), 2000 WL 33957691, at *1-3 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 25, 2000), affd on different grounds, 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003); California v. Gen. Motors, 2007
WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (dismissing a suit by California seeking damages againsl car
manufacturers based on acommon law global warming nuisance tort claim on the grounds that the issues were
non-justiciable political questions).
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application of a state statute dealing with the same issue. For example, the
Supreme Court recently held that some, but not all, aspects of state tort law
could be preempted by federal statutes regulating the labeling of pesticides. 173
In some of the cases involving foreign affairs, the claim of exclusive national
authority is similarly predicated on a federal statute.
But in other instances, the claim for preemption rests on executive action
rather than on legislative directives. Moreover, the argument is sometimes
based on a potential, but inchoate, conflict with a national policy. Entwined is
a general notion that the Constitution could directly preclude state involvement
in problems categorized as "foreign." Arguments thus run from an actual
incompatibility based on comparing local laws and federal statutes to instances
when the conflicts are "dormant.,,174 And, rather than having a presumption
against preemption and in favor of concurrency, some judges have relied on a
presumed special federal authority over areas related to foreign affairs,
including immigration, to find local initiatives illegal. I75
Therefore, before considering the wisdom of foreign affairs preemption as
a policy, one needs to attend to the kind of legal questions there entailed. In
the area of foreign affairs preemption, constitutional considerations sometimes
leak into statutory interpretation through the assumption that the Constitution
allocates exclusive power to the national government in areas of "foreign
affairs." Yet, as I have shown, categorization of an issue as about "foreign"
rather than "domestic" affairs is problematic. Because issues are often both
foreign and domestic, the decision to affix one label or another is an act
entailing a good deal of discretionary decisionmaking. 176
One can thus see that the judicial justifications for national exclusivity
based on constitutional mandates are court-made doctrines to mediate
federalist problems. In my view, they are appropriately categorized with other
jurisprudential doctrines such as abstention. Hence, Congress may direct
courts not to block local decisions, and the courts can rework their own
173 See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005); Joseph Frueh, Comment, Pesticides,
Preemption. and the Return ofTort Protection, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 299 (2006).
174 See, e.g., Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), discussed infra notes 179-85 and accompanying
text.
175 See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 517-30 (M.D. Pa. 2007). This decision is
an example of the use of federal law to strike a local anti-immigrant effort, called the "Illegal Immigration
Relief Act Ordinance" (which included an amendment called the "Official English Ordinance"). In contrast,
the court held that, under current federal equal protection law, the ordinance was permissible. Id. at 538--46.
176 That discretion and the interaction between constitutional and statutory interpretation are not unique to
foreign affairs preemption but can be found in other preemption analyses. See Merrill, supra note 22.
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doctrine to direct less deference. But some opinions on foreign affairs
preemption contain text creating a doctrine of "constitutional dimensions,"
akin to some of the decisions on standing, political question, and state secrets.
If this doctrine is characterized as constitutional common law or constitutional
law itself, foreign affairs preemption is not so readily revised by Congress.
Thus this doctrine could serve as a powerful means by which judges protect
presidential and congressional power from local democratic forces.
Tum then to understand more about when questions of "foreign affairs" are
understood to be present. What kinds of actions by localities trigger the
application of these doctrines? One can create typologies of different kinds of
local actions to determine how courts might respond, ranging from efforts to
promote local trade to those aimed at influencing the practices of either the
United States or other countries. 177 Here, I explore the answers by applying
that question to the examples used thus far in this Article. Is San Francisco's
incorporation of CEDAW "legal"? What about the Mayors' agreements on
Kyoto? 178
177 See. e.g., Nick Robinson, Citizens Not Subjects: U.S. Foreign Relations Law and the Decentralization
ofForeign Policy, 40 AKRON L. REV. 647 (2007).
178 In tenns of case law, insofar as I am aware, no challenges have been brought to local adoption of
CEDAW precepts. In contrast, one can find a few reported cases raising objections to local programs related
to climate control. For example, one group successfully challenged Seattle's program of paying public and
private entities to reduce emissions; the Supreme Court of Washington concluded that the public utility did not
have the power under state law to use ratepayers' money for offsets. See Okeson v. Seattle, 150 P.3d 556
(Wash. 2(07).
Another group of cases, decided in 2006 and 2007, considered challenges by automobile dealers to
California's Air Resources Board, which had issued regulations on greenhouse gas emissions that were
subsequently adopted in Vermont-spawning litigation in federal district courts in both states with somewhat
different outcomes. In the California litigation, a district judge considered pretrial motions on the preemption
issues. See Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 456 F.Supp.2d 1160, 1167-88 (E.D. Cal. 2006). The
district judge concluded that the California regulations were preempted, absent an EPA waiver, by the Clean
Air Act. {d. at 1174-75. The district court also concluded that the regulations were not preempted under
another federal environmental statute, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, nor under the Dormant
Commerce Clause. {d. at 1167, 1186. Further, the district court held for the defendants that no preemption
existed based on federal anti-trust law. In contrast, the district court held that the car dealers had stated a claim
under foreign affairs preemption but did not then decide its merits. {d. at 1187. Thereafter, on January 16,
2007, the judge stayed the ruling pending the decision by the Supreme Court in Massachusells v. EPA, which
was subsequently decided on April 2, 2007. See Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3002 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16,2(07); Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). In contrast to the
California ruling, the district court in Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 2007 WL
2669444 (D. Vt. Sept. 12, 2(07), held that Vermont's regulations that used California's greenhouse gas
emission standards for new cars were not preempted under either the Clean Air Act or the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act or the doctrine of foreign affairs preemption.
The question remains whether the posture of such litigation will shift as car manufacturers redefine
their concerns to focus on global warming. See. e.g., Micheline Maynard, Mulally Names an Environmental
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1. Foreign Affairs Preemption: The Confused Doctrinal Predicates
Before seeing the choices to be made in answering, an understanding of the
contours of three of the major Supreme Court decisions relating to foreign
affairs preemption's shape is needed. The first is Zschemig v. Miller, 179
decided in 1968. In Zschemig an Oregon resident had died intestate. Oregon
courts denied her heirs, who were residents of the "Soviet Zone of Germany"
(East Germany), distribution of the property based on an Oregon statute that
required reciprocity from a country of an alien before that alien could inherit
property probated in Oregon. 180 In reaching that decision, the Supreme Court
of Oregon had relied on a 1947 U.S. Supreme Court case involving the 1923
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Germany; the
Oregon Court understood that case as permitting aliens to inherit real, but not
personal, property under a particular treaty with Germany. 181
In the Supreme Court, the United States as amicus curiae argued that it was
time to interpret the provisions of the 1923 Treaty with Germany in light of
subsequent events (the partition of Germany and a separate treaty governing
rights of West Germans in the Federal Republic of Germany) to permit the
alien to inherit both real and personal property.182 Further, the United States
government argued that applying the state's statute would not constitute "an
undue interference with the conduct of the foreign relations of the United
States.,,183 But the Supreme Court disagreed, determining for itself that
Oregon intruded on the "field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts
to the President and the Congress.,,184 As a consequence and based on what
eventually would be termed the "dormant foreign affairs" power,185 the Court
held the Oregon statute invalid. The issue was "dormant," in that no actual
Executivefor Ford, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 24, 2007, at C3 (describing the appointment of a new vice president for
"sustainability, environment, and safety engineering").
179 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
180 See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), 1967 WL
113577, at *3 [hereinafter US Amicus Brief, Zschemig].
181 That case, Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S 503 (1947), had interpreted the 1923 Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Consular Rights with Germany.
182 US Amicus Brief, Zschernig, supra note 180, at *7-8 & n.IO.
183 /d. at *8 n.lO. The government argued that earlier federal precedents had improperly construed federal
treaties to distinguish rights to inherit personal and real property and that foreign nationals ought to be able to
inherit both forms of property. [d. at *6.
184 Zschemig, 389 U.S. at 432.
185 Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396,439 (2003) (referencing Zschemig as an example of this
form of preemption). For an excellent analysis of the issues, see Sam Walsh, Note, Foreign Affairs
Preemption and State Regulation ofGreenhouse Gas Emissions, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1877 (2006)
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conflict with American foreign policy had been claimed nor were facts
specified that the decision would cause a specific problem.
The two, more recent, Supreme Court decisions arose not because a state
court was trying to implement its understanding of a federal treaty but because
state legislatures had concluded that they are opposed to practices of other
countries that affect their locality. Seeking to promote or protect human rights,
some states have conditioned the spending of their tax dollars or permission to
do business within their borders on compliance with specific obligations. The
Supreme Court has struck down those local efforts. In a challenge to
Massachusetts's decision not to do business with or spend its own money on
goods from Burma (Myanmar) because of forced labor, the Supreme Court
ruled in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council186 that the state's edicts
violated the exclusivity of national authority to decide how to impose sanctions
on that country. A variation of the foreign affairs preemption doctrine was
presented in American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi l87 when the Court struck
California's requirements that insurance companies which had done business
in Europe during the Holocaust disclose information about that work as a
condition of doing business in the state.
Formally, under preemption doctrine, the default rule is one of
concurrency. Absent an express congressional directive on preemption, or
evidence of a congressional decision to "occupy the field," or a demonstrable
conflict between state and federal provisions, both state and federal regimes
are supposed to co-exist. Yet in Zschernig, Crosby, and Garamendi, the
Supreme Court insisted on the exclusivity of national power based on general
assertions of the risk of potential harms-thereby shaping a judicial doctrine to
protect national interests from state decisions. That result is especially striking
in Zschernig, in which the Court rejected the executive branch's submission
that alien inheritance was not a problem of international proportions. Instead,
in the middle of the Cold War, the justices themselves concluded that the issue
of alien inheritance could affect how the United States managed its interaction
with other nations. The Court therefore banned that state's legislation not
186 530 U.s. 363 (2000). The legislation prohibited state agencies from signing contracts with companies
doing business in Bunna and, as of November of 1997, the "restricted purchase list named 48 U.S. companies
and 205 non-U.S. companies that could not do business with the state of Massachusetts." See Guay, supra
note 38, at 355. The measure was supported by those within Burma who opposed the governing regime, just
as Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC) had supported sanctions against South Africa.
[d.
187 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
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because of an actual conflict with federal law or based on evidence of a real
disruption in international relations but because of the Court's own assessment
of the potential (but donnant) possibilities.
In both Crosby and Garamendi, the executive pressed the Court for
preemption and got it. And in both cases, the Court did not insist on clear
congressional directives before setting aside state law making. For example, in
Crosby, the only relevant federal legislation was a general congressional
authorization for the President to impose sanctions, but which made no
mention of what effect such authorization ought to have on state sanctions. 188
Yet, the Court concluded that Massachusetts' decision not to spend state tax
dollars on certain products produced by companies investing in Bunna
breached the prerogatives of the executive under that legislation. 189
In Garamendi, the Court went further in the sense that no national
legislation addressed the question of sanctions against companies that had done
business in Gennany during the Holocaust. Rather, the Court relied on
Executive representations that California's legislation would affect the
settlement efforts. 190 Moreover, Justice Souter's opinion positioned the
settlement of Holocaust victims' claims as concerning foreign affairs when he
spoke about "field preemption." One might, instead, have characterized the
relevant "field" as insurance law, over which the states have had control for
decades. 191 This "Uludicial protection of the President's bargaining chips,,192
188 See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570(b), 110 Stat. 3009-
166 (1996) (''The President is hereby authorized to prohibit, and shall prohibit United States persons from new
investment in Burma, if the President determines and certifies to Congress that, after the date of enactment of
this Act, the Government of Burma has physically harmed, rearrested for political acts, or exiled Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi or has committed largescale repression of or violence against the Democratic opposition.").
189 See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000), 2000 WL 194805 (Feb. 14, 2000), at *10 (citing the federal legislation
related to the Uruguay Round trade agreements and federal procurement guidelines as establishing the national
policy with which the Massachusetts regulations conflicted).
190 See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi,
539 U.S. 396 (2003), 2003 WL 721754, at *5 (Feb. 24, 2003) (describing the federal government's
encouragement of the "use of voluntary, non-adversarial mechanisms for resolving Holocaust victims' claims"
and contrasting that approach with California's statutory obligations and arguing that the state laws "directly
interfere with the national government's authority over foreign affairs and foreign commerce"). The brief
argued that the California legislation "impermissibly intrudes" into the conduct of both "diplomatic and
commercial relations with other nations-that is exclusively reserved to the President and the Congress." [d.
at *8.
191 One can similarly characterize many kinds of federal legislation relating to bankruptcy, immigration,
pensions, and federal benefits, as "federal laws of the family," and thus one should be leery of "categorical"
claims of exclusive competence. See Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender and the
Globe, III YALELJ. 619,644--46 (2001).
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has reshaped the doctrine to bring more local actions into question through
what many commentators understand to have been an expansion of "foreign
affairs preemption," 193 just as the Court has done in other preemption cases not
. I' ., . .,.,. 194mvo vmg lorelgn aualfS.
What impact would this doctrine have on local initiatives related to
CEDAW and Kyoto? Formal differences can readily be found between all
three of the Supreme Court cases and either San Francisco's CEDAW
provision or the mayors' agreements on climate controls. First, the CEDAW
and Kyoto resolutions are local actions imposing new ("foreign") obligations
on domestic government actors. Second, Congress has not directly and
affirmatively legislated specifically on these particular issues. Third, neither
the CEDAW nor Kyoto initiatives are attempts to prevent support for a specific
foreign nation with particular oppressive policies, but instead impose inward-
looking rules affected by insights from abroad. 195
Yet, both of these examples touch arenas in which federal legislation
relates, in some respects, to the issues taken up by local actors. Further, given
the growing breadth of foreign affairs preemption, one could argue that both
examples signal to actors abroad an internal disagreement about how to
respond to CEDAW and Kyoto and therefore ought to be silenced because of
the need to speak in "one voice."I96 While hortatory resolutions calling for
192 Foreign Affairs Preemption. supra note 185 at 1883.
193 See. e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v. Garamendi
and Executive Preemption ofForeign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825 (2004).
194 See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007). That decision exemplifies what is called
"agency preemption." See Merrill, supra note 22. In Watters, fifty states had joined together to file a brief
arguing that they had a traditional role in consumer protection that ought not to be dispossessed through
agency action. See Brief for New York et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Watters v. Wachovia
Bank, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007) (No. 05-1342), 2006 WL 2570992. As the dissent by Justice Stevens explained,
the majority gave deference to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's decision that local regulations
were incompatible, thereby creating a new genre of preemption that further enhanced the power of the federal
executive. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1573 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195 See Emily Chiang, Think Locally, Act Globally? Dormant Federal Common Law Preemption of State
and Local Activities Affecting Foreign Affairs, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 923, 974-75 (2003) (arguing for
preemption).
196 See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) ("[The] negative Foreign Commerce
Clause protects the National Government's ability to speak with 'one voice' in regulating commerce with
foreign countries.") (internal citation omitted). Whether state-based emissions regulations would affect
international efforts is a question analyzed in Walsh, supra note 185, at 1890-98. The author argued that the
provisions ought to be permitted because the state interest was strong, the national government commitments
both unclear and not reduced to controlling law, and predictions of effects indeterminate. That commentator
proposed that the foreign affairs preemption presumption ought to be confined to state interactions that "speak
directly to foreign governments, foreign nationals, or their business partners." Id. at 1897.
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federal legislation are unlikely to be challenged or, if challenged, are likely to
be protected by the First Amendment, implementation efforts that impose
obligations would not be so shielded. But the courts cannot reach the question
without a challenger, and it is a pattern in the case law that most challenges
arise because a local action affects the commercial interests of a person or an
entity, in some instances of a network of entities; that is the topic to which I
turn next.
2. Networked Corporate Interests Challenging Local Initiatives:
USA *Engage, NFTC, and Darfur
Local government officials are not the only ones involved in translocal
networks. They have their counterparts in groups of commercial entities which
have also banded together. Some of these organizations are relative
newcomers while others, like the municipalities that formed the National
League of Cities more than a century ago, have a longer pedigree. An example
of a corporate network is "USA*Engage," formed in the late 1990s in response
to waves of proposals to impose economic sanctions limiting trade with
particular nations. As USA*Engage explains, before 1997, "no organized
voice" existed to urge "careful examination of sanctions proposals," and no
entity ensured that "America's economic, diplomatic and strategic interests"
were not "compromised by the imposition of unilateral economic sanctions for
foreign policy reasons" without "full consideration" of the costs imposed to the
national economy, to com~etitiveness, and to the "security, commercial, and
human rights objections."l 7
USA*Engage, in turn, is related to the National Foreign Trade Council
(NFfC)198 which, as a plaintiff in the Crosby case, succeeded in halting the
Massachusetts prohibition on purchasing goods from Burma. 199 Founded in
1914, the NFfC describes itself as the "oldest and largest U.S. association of
businesses devoted to international trade matters,,,200 that its membership
197 See USA*Engage. About Us, http://www.usaengage.org/MBR0088-USAengageidefault.asp?id=11O
(last visited Nov. 4. 2007).
198 See Guay, supra note 38, at 374 (referring to NFfC as "USA Engage's parent organization"); Eric
Thomas, National Foreign Trade Council Names Jake Colvin as New Director of USA*Engage, Aug. 16,
2005. available at http://www.nftc.orgtnewsflashlnewsflash.asp?Mode=View&articleid=1737&Category=AlI
(last visited Nov. 4, 2007). A review critical of USA*Engage is provided by the Center for Media and
Democracy. See http://www.sourcewatch.orgtindex.php?title=USA_Engage (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). .
199 See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
200 See USA*Engage, Profile of the National Foreign Trade Council, http://www.usaengage.orgtarchivesl
backgroundlnftc.html (last visited Nov. I, 2007).
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consists of some 550 companies, including "most of the 50 largest U.S.
banks,"zOi and that it is the "premier business organization advocating a rules-
based world economy."zoz
The NFfC has sparred not only with Massachusetts but also with the
Genocide Intervention Network, formed to encourage "targeted Sudan
divestment campaigns" in an effort to bring attention to and stop the genocide
in Darfur?03 That divestment effort has produced legislation in California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon,
and Vermont?04 Illinois, for example, enacted the 2005 Act to End Atrocities
and Terrorism in the Sudan, which restricted the depositing of state funds in
financial entities whose customers have certain connections with the Sudan
and which prohibited the placement of state pension funds in such entities?05
In March of 2007, the NFTC succeeded in convincing a lower federal court
judge to enjoin that act on the grounds of foreign affairs preemption. Although
the group of corporate plaintiffs had agreed that they could comply with both
state and federal regulations, the district court concluded that, in light of
federal executive orders and the 2000 Trade Sanctions Reform and Export
Enhancement Act, some of the state regulations "took a different tack" from
201 See id.
202 See NFfC, About Us, http://www.nftc.org/default.asp?Mode=DirectoryDisplay&id=93 (last visited
Nov. 1,2007). The objections raised by the NFfC include expanding exports, protecting foreign investments
and enhancing competitiveness. !d.; see also O.K. Davis, The National Foreign Trade Council, 94 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 118 (1921). Guay argued that concern about consumer boycotts is the reason.
Guay, supra note 38, at 369.
203 See Sudan Divestment Task Force, Home Page, http://www.sudandivestment.org/home.asp (last
visited Nov. 4, 2(07).
204 See Sudan Divestment Legislative Chart, http://sudandivestment.org/legislative_chart.asp; Sudan
Divestment Task Force's Model Targeted Divestment Proposal, available at http://sudandivestment.org/
position.asp#model (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). The proposal is designed for use by any institution, primarily
by U.S. companies, and calls for divestment from those businesses that have a business relationship with the
government of Sudan, who lack a "substantial corporate governance policy regarding the Darfur situation,"
and whose work in Sudan "impart[s] minimal benefit to the country's underprivileged." [d. The Task Force
reported that its proposal followed failed efforts to convince companies to change their policies. Sudan
Divestment Task Force, Targeted Divestment at a Glance, available at http://sudandivestment.org/position.
asp#model (last visited Nov. 4, 2(07).
205 See The Act to End Atrocities and Terrorism in the Sudan, Public Act 094-0079 (June 27, 2005,
effective Jan. 27, 2006). This legislation is somewhat broader than provisions enacted elsewhere, including
California, Colorado, Iowa, and Vermont, which track more closely the model of the Sudan Divestment Task
Force, supra note 203. See Legislative Action Map, http://www.sudandivestment.orglhome.asp#map (last
visited Nov. 4, 2007).
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the federal policy and were therefore preempted based on foreign affairs
preemption and on the power of Congress to regulate foreign commerce.206
3. Congressional Protection ofLocal Divestment Initiatives: A New
Iteration ofthe Political Safeguards ofFederalism
In March of 2007, one day after the district court opinion was rendered,
Senator Richard Durbin of Illinois introduced the Sudan Divestment
Authorization Act of 2007 ("SDAA,,).207 Co-sponsors included fellow Illinois
Senator Barack Obama, Connecticut Senator Joseph Lieberman, and
Republican Senators Arlen Specter from Pennsylvania and John Cornyn from
Texas.208 The proposal states that the "sense of Congress" is that state and
governmental entities should be able to divest assets "within their jurisdiction
as an expression of opposition to the genocidal actions and policies of the
Government of Sudan"; that the divestiture does not violate the Constitution
because it is not preempted by the Supremacy Clause nor does it impose "an
undue burden on foreign or interstate commerce" or "intrude on, or interfere
with, the conduct of foreign affairs of the United States.,,209
Earlier that year, in January of 2007, another bill, the Darfur Accountability
and Divestment Act ("DADA"), had been proposed in the House of
Representatives. DADA requires that, upon consultation with other branches
and notice to those affected, the Secretary of the Treasury is to create lists of
those with "direct investment" in the Sudan or conducting "business
operations" of certain kinds?lO In addition to obliging the federal government
to generate the list, the bill also requires that companies so listed report to the
206 See Nat'! Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, No. 06 C 4251, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13341 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 23, 2007). The NFTC's suit, filed as a § 1983 action, was joined by eight municipal pension funds in
the state and by beneficiaries of pension funds. While the NFTC prevailed on some of its preemption claims,
the NFTC's objection to the provision's bar of investments in securities that do business with the Sudan was
rejected as posing nothing "more than a hypothetical impact on the national government's conduct of foreign
affairs." [d. at *38-42.
207 Sudan Divestment Authorization Act of 2007, S. 831, IIOth Congo (March 8, 2007) [hereinafter
SDAA). That bill came after related measures had been introduced in the House. See Darfur Accountability
and Divestment Act of 2007, H.R. 180, 110 Congo (Jan. 4, 2007) [hereinafter DADA), discussed infra note 210
and accompanying text.
208 See Library of Congress: Thomas, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-binJbdquery/z?dIIO:SN00831:@@@P.
209 SDAA, supra note 207, § 3.
210 DADA, supra note 207, § 3. Its legislative sponsor was Barbara Lee, a Democrat from California.
See Library of Congress: Thomas, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-binlbdquery/z?dllO:HROOI80:@@@X. A
companion bill was introduced in the Senate on August 1,2007. H.R. 180 RFS, 1I0th Congo (Aug. 1,2007),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=II030nlLbills&docid=f:h18Orfs.txt.
pdf.
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SEC which in tum would publish that list. Under the proposed legislation,
federal contracts could not be awarded to such companies. Further, DADA
states that the "policy of the United States [is] to support the decision of any
State or local government to divest" their assets from entities so listed (as well
as specified others), providing that notice and opportunities to respond are
given to the companies subject to sanctions.211 In July, that bill passed the
House 418-1,212 and in the fall of 2007, the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs held hearings on DADA.213
Appearing before the legislators were the same set of actors who disagree
about these issues in court. Testifying in opposition to the legislation was the
President of NFTC, who was also identified as the Co-Chairman of
USA*Engage.214 He argued that the Act's approach was not likely to be
effective but would have "serious foreign policy, Constitutional and
compliance concerns.,,215 Characterizing the "governor and legislature of
Texas, Illinois, or California" as not "competent bodies" to implement foreign
policy, he stated that he was "baffIe[d] ... why Members of Congress would
want to take foreign policy out of their and the President's hands and
subcontract it to local government.,,216 Further, he argued that compliance
would involve "enormous ... difficulties for companies, as each state and local
law is different," impose "compliance costs on businesses," and was not "free
for retirees." Moreover, he opined that DADA was "unconstitutional," citing
Crosby v. NFTC, and likely a violation of the World Trade Organization's
rules.217
The Executive Branch shared in that opposition by providing objections
that overlapped with those leveled by the NFTC. The Director of the Office of
Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury stated that the
Bush Administration "opposes proposals to authorize divestment by state and
local governments, which impair the ability of the president to act on behalf of
211 DADA,supranote207.§4.
212 See 153 CONGo REc. H921O-01 (July 31, 2007); see also Genocide Intervention Network, Victory!
Important Legislation Passes House, http://www.genocideintervention.netlnodelI060 (last visited Nov. 4,
2007).
213 See Combating Genocide in Darfur: The Role of Divestment and Other Policy Tools: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, I 10th Congo (Oct. 3, 2007). http://banking.senate.gov/
index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Detail&Hearing1D=282.
214 See id. (statement of William A. Reinsch. President, National Foreign Trade Council), http://banking.
senate.gov'-fiIes/reinsch.pdf.
215 [d. at I.
216 [d. at 2.
217 [d. at 2-3.
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the nation as a whole and risk creating a multiplicity of foreign policies.,,218
Another representative of the United States Government, speaking for the
Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, stressed that the President
needed "maximum flexibility" because "[t]iming is everything.,,219
In contrast, the voices of states were heard through testimony from the
Treasurer of Rhode Island, charged with managing that state's pension funds.
He insisted that "divestment from Sudan represents a choice by the state to
invest its money in concert with the values of its citizens," and that each state
possessed the "right and the capacity to invest based on social, humanitarian
and financial values," as long as they were financially prudent.22o "[W]e will
not allow genocide to occur on our watch, nor will we allow genocide to occur
on our dollar.,,221 Those sentiments were echoed by Senator Sam Brownback
of Kansas who, along with Senator Durbin, was a co-sponsor of the bill.222
Also joining in support was a vice president of a "socially responsible" mutual
fund company, expressing the fund's view that targeted divestment is both
fiscally responsible and effective if undertaken in conjunction with other
actions.223
The sequence that produced the proposed Darfur legislation and the groups
arrayed in support and opposition exemplifies the idea of a "democratic
iteration,,,224 through which policies are debated by the backs and forths of
public actions, as some activists seek divestment, others object, the courts
opine, and the legislature is asked to weigh in.225 States, joining a network of
NGOs, have gone to Congress to seek protection from both the Executive and
218 [d. (statement of Adam J. Szubin, Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the
Treasury), http://banking.senate.govU'iles/ACF848E.pdf,at 9.
219 [d. (statement of Elizabeth L. Dibble, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Finance
and Development, Department of State), http://banking.senate.gov/_files/dibble.pdf,at 4.
220 [d. (statement of Frank T. Caprio, General Treasurer of the State of Rhode Island), http://banking.
senate.gov/_files/caprio.pdf, at 4-5.
221 [d. at 6.
222 See id. (statement of Sen. Sam Brownback), http://banking.senate.govCfiles/brownback.pdf.
223 See id. (statement of Bennett Freeman, Senior Vice President for Social Research and Policy, Calvert
Investment), http://banking.senate.gov/_files/freeman.pdf,atl.
224 See SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS AND CITIZENS 171-212 (2004).
225 Another example of the turn to courts as a part of democratic differences comes from the challenge,
brought by the Mayor of the City of New York, to a New York City Counsel provision requiring workers,
whether in the United States or abroad, to be paid above the poverty rate by limiting city procurement to only
"responsible manufacturers" who paid non-poverty wages. See New York, N.Y. Local Law 20 of 2001,
codified at N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, ch. I, §§ 6-124 (effective Jan. 20, 2002). This section was found to be
invalid under state, rather than federal law. Mayor of New York v. Council of New York, 789 N.Y.S.2d 860
(Sup. Ct. 2004).
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Judicial Branches of the federal government. For constitutional lawyers, one
of the bills, the SDAA, returns us to questions outlined above-about whether
the doctrine of foreign affairs preemption is of constitutional dimensions
protected from congressional alteration or a court-made policy of deference,
subject to correction from Congress as that Act proposes to do.
Were either of these proposed bills authorizing Sudan divestiture to be
enacted, under contemporary constitutional interpretive practices, federal
judges would be authorized independently to "review" the congressional
"findings" (but less clearly the "sense" of the Congress) about the impact of
divestiture on foreign affairs and commerce.226 Legal questions posed by the
SDAA include whether it, like the proposed Constitutional Restoration Act of
2005, impermissibly impinges on judicial independence by directing a rule of
decision if applied retrospectively.227 Further, both the SDAA and DADA
raise questions about whether the legislation impermissibly imposes on the
Executive's power over foreign affairs. Under my approach to foreign affairs
preemption law, which locates it as a judge-made doctrine, legislation such as
the proposed Sudan Divestment Act is a permissible exercise of congressional
authority, for it does not "direct" a rule of decision in a specific case.228 And,
under my approach to "foreign affairs" in this federated structure, that term
ought not be used to try to divest Congress or the states from participating in
the development of policy relating to events beyond our borders.
To understand why courts ought not to interfere, it is useful to explore the
parallels and distinctions between today's question of local legislative efforts
and foreign affairs preemption and twentieth-century concerns that framed
226 The Court has taken different approaches to facts found by Congress. In Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S.
Ct. 1610. 1637 (2007), the Court stated that "[a]lthough we review congressional factfinding under a
deferential standard, we do not in the circumstances here place dispositive weight to Congress' findings. The
Court retains an independent constitutional duty to review factual findings where constitutional rights are at
stake." In contrast, in Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369-72 (2001), when finding
unconstitutional the imposition of liability on states for discrimination against the disabled, the Court
reconsidered the findings of Congress and concluded that the record of evidence was insufficient to sustain the
legislation. Similarly, in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614-16 (2000), the Court also revisited
congressional findings and found them wanting when it invalidated the civil right remedy of the Violence
Against Women Act.
227 See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995);
Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
228 See Lawrence G. Sager, Klein's First Principle.' A Proposed Solution, 86 GEO. LJ. 2525 (1998). My
focus here is the shape of domestic law. When trade sanction issues are at stake, restrictions on purchasing can
be challenged as failures to comply with World Trade Agreements that require open and competitive
procurement contracts. See Guay, supra note 38, at 359-61 (also noting that Massachusetts's efforts to impose
sanctions on Burma affected European policies).
HeinOnline -- 57 Emory L.J. 84 2007-2008
84 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57
Wechsler's preference for the "political safeguards of federalism.,,229
Wechsler's view was that courts ought to be reluctant to overturn federal
legislation at the behest of states because states have avenues to be heard
directly in Congress. One example substantiating that claim came after the
Supreme Court held, in the 1980s, that localities were not immune from federal
legislation on wages and hours?30 Thereafter, localities went back to Congress
and obtained distinctive treatment for how they, unlike other employers, are
. d I l' . 231penrutte to compensate emp oyees lor overtime.
In contrast, in SDAA and DADA, the 2007 proposals related to Sudan
divestment, states are seeking congressional protection from the courts,
which-in the name of nationalism-have given exclusive license to the
President and somewhat to Congress. Should judges insulate the national
government's political branches from local efforts aimed at shifting policies
about how to deal with genocide in Darfur, or with forced labor in Burma, or
with equal rights for women and men? Return to the categorization of the
local initiatives that I discussed earlier. Some of the enactments are
expressive, advocating that the federal government adopt a particular policy or
stating a commitment to certain aims. Litigation comes, in contrast, from those
initiatives which I categorized as programmatic, implementing a policy by
changing a local law. While some of these initiatives have externalities
(imposing obligations on national or transnational businesses), many place
burdens or constraints on governmental actors within their jurisdiction. The
actual impact on national policy is often unclear ("dormant"). Yet, in the
muddy situations, judges are stepping in (contra Wechsler's suggestion) to
foreclose local political judgments. When doing so, courts broaden their own
authority to decide when national interests require preemption of state and
local legislation.
One puzzle is why courts have been so expansive in this arena. A review
offoreign affairs preemption cases suggests that judges are easily impressed by
the invocation of the "foreign," fearful of the risk that a court's judgment could
have an effect on international relations, and eager to extract themselves and
lower courts from adjudicating such questions. This posture dates back
229 See Wechsler, supra note 18.
230 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
231 As a result of the Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Garcia, Congress passed amendments permitting
state and local governments to compensate their employees for overtime hours worked with compensatory
time off in lieu of overtime pay. See Pub. L. No. 99-150, § 6, 99 Stat. 787 (codified as amended 29 U.S.c.
§ 203 (1985)).
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decades, as can be seen from the Court's elaboration in the 1960s of the "act of
state" doctrine, addressing the import on litigation in the United States of a
decision made by another nation. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,232
a case filed in federal court under diversity jurisdiction and thereby
presumptively governed under the Erie doctrine by New York law, Justice
Harlan insisted on the Court's power to shape its own federal common law
rule, halting the effort to recover funds expropriated by a financial agency of
Cuba.233 Moreover, in that case, as in the 1968 decision in Zschemig, the
Executive had not itself insisted that the national interest required that national
law displace state rules.234 Rather, in Sabbatino, the government had declined
to "make any statement bearing" on the litigation.235
In both Sabbatino and Zschemig, anxiety about the Cold War resulted in
rulings reflecting judges' concerns that decisions could have effects of some
unspecified dimensions that would or could do harm. That judicial posture
continued to be expressed, as evidenced in Crosby, and has intensified as
terrorist threats have become acute. However, as I have argued elsewhere,
such an expansionist view of "the foreign" and of national power is unduly
intolerant of variation and unduly empowering of national prerogatives and of
the Executive in particular.236 Lost in this approach is a premise of this
democratic federation that local efforts to effectuate protection of rights have a
presumptive validity. As illustrated by the back-and-forth amongst courts and
legislatures in the context of the Sudan, local action has invited democratic
contestation about how to respond to the horrors there.
As noted in the opening discussion of these questions, Wechsler's approach
has been criticized on the grounds that he overestimated Congress as a forum
232 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
233 ld; see generally Louis Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 805 (1964); see also Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700-01 (2004); W.S. Kirkpatrick &
Co., Inc. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990). The act of state doctrine is a defense on the merits, in
addition to the immunities conferred by the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1330. Further, it is distinct from the doctrine of "international comity," according respect to acts of foreign
nations, whether on their own soil or in the United States, if consistent with United States policy. See
generally Christopher C. Wheeler & Amir Attaran, Declawing the Vulture Funds: Rehabilitation of a Comity
Defense in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 39 STAN. J.INT'L L. 253 (2003).
234 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 420. Further, the American Bar Association filed a brief arguing the merits on
the assumption that that the Supreme Court, "like the courts below, will not regard itself as barred by the act of
state doctrine from considering the asserted violations of international law," and then argued that international
law made the expropriation illegal. Brief for the Am. Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (I 964)(No. 16), 1963 WL 105635, at *3.
235 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 420 & n.19.
236 See Resnik, Law's Migration, supra note 164, at 1652-53.
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that fairly represents the divergent interests of different states. Commentators
have argued that the courts ought to step in, at the behest of states, and at times
invalidate congressional legislation because Congress is not a level playing
field.237 The argument is that population and wealth allocations across the
country make the two-senators-per-state system democratically unfair. Further
evidence comes from data that senators from different states bring vastly
different amounts of money home to their constituents.238
But the paradigm proffered here-state and local enactment of legislation
and resolutions-is the outgrowth of interactions at the horizontal level
resulting in individual localities or states adopting specific measures. Non-
unifonnity is a predicate of federalist systems, which can impose a national
norm but which ought to be dedicated to local divergence whenever tolerable.
Moreover, as different localities generate various provisions, one can
interrogate one's own norms through a comparative exercise.239 Furthermore,
the proposed federal legislation on Darfur offers an amalgam, in which federal
legislative action is sought to reduce problems of disunifonnity and yet to
enable (within boundaries) local decisionmaking on divestment. When the
democratic qualities of local action are coupled with the worrisome efforts by
the Executive to enhance its authority over many arenas, the result ought to be
reluctance by the Judiciary to set aside local provisions based on speculative
and diffuse claims of potential harms to national interests.24o
Of course, that presumption is subject to revision if one were to find
systematic evidence of local action that undermines democratic opportunities.
For example, Michael Greve has raised concerns about a "cartel" in which
state officials, acting in concert, monopolize forms of authority.241 Another
237 All three of the articles by Lynn Baker. supra notes 19 & 35, make this point. She argued, for
example, that Congress "regularly uses fiscal redistribution among the states and conditional federal spending
to impinge" on state autonomy and that states "cannot protect themselves through the federal political process
against" various exercises of congressional power. Baker, Spending Power, supra note 35, at 198.
238 Arecent example of the differences among senators is a chart ranking the "earmarked" money that
each state received through congressional appropriations. California ranked at the top, with Alaska placing
sixth, giving about $1.000 per capita in contrast to $25.05 per capita allocations for those in North Carolina.
See Matt Kelley, Congress Slated $5.6b in Bills for Private Sector, USA TODAY, Apr. 26, 2007, at A5
(providing achart of "earmarks per state").
239 See Jennifer Nedelsky, Conununities of Judgment and Human Rights, 1THEoREflCAL INQUIRIES L. 245
(2000).
240 One can view the desirability of constraining judicial power in this context or as part of abroader view
of appropriate limits, for which Larry Kramer's work stands as acontemporary landmark. See, e.g., Larry D.
Kramer, "The Interests of the Man"; James Madison, Popular Constitutionalism, and the Theory of
Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 697 (2006) (published as the Seeger Lecture).
241 See Greve, Cartel Federalism?, supra note 31; Greve, Compacts, Cartels, supra note 34.
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possibility would be that certain states could be systematically excluded from
interstate cooperation,242 or that local action will draw attention and voters but
will be a distraction because the level of policy intervention cannot generate
the impact needed.243 Yet, the examples drawn upon above-CEDAW, Kyoto,
and the Sudan-involve iterative coordination but not a singularity of power
that signals undue concentrations of authority. To the contrary, it is the
judiciary acting in concert with the executive that appears to be centralizing
power in the national government.
Instead, judges ought to adopt a posture of non-encroachment by insisting
on exacting evidence of particular and specific imminent harms before
invalidating actions by localities or by states as those entities determine their
own expenditures of funds and rules. To do so would entail abandonment of
the "dormant foreign affairs" approach. Judicial interventions ought to occur
only when a demonstrable showing has been made that a specific local
directive conflicts directly with, or is completely incompatible with,
congressional mandates. Executive representations, generic statements in
congressional resolutions, general authority for executive negotiations to take
place, and concerns about economic competitiveness should not suffice to
preclude local action.244
IV. THE END OF BUCOLIC FEDERALISM
This Article has documented the degree to which local and state actors
work in conjunction with their counterparts as they shape and are in tum
affected by policies that transcend the boundaries of their jurisdictions.
Whether shopping for goods and services or generating human rights laws,
242 Cf Bowman, supra note 23. Seeking to identify variables to indicate a propensity to cooperate,
Bowman tracked the differential rates at which states entered compacts, undertook multistate legal action, or
adopted uniform state laws. Id. at 539--42.
243 In contrast, local action can serve as a "trigger" to national and international interventions. See Kirsten
Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State and Local Governments to
Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB.
LAW. 1015, 1025 (2006); see also Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, Bottom-Up Federalism: The Diffusion
ofAntismoking Policies from u.s. Cities to States, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 825 (2006).
244 Debate about whether the broadening scope of preemption in other areas is problematic can be found
in Merrill, supra note 22; Stephen Gardbaum, Congress's Power to Preempt the States, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 39
(2005); Richard H. Fallon, The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U.
CHI. L. REv. 429, 471-72 (2002). Others worry about "state regulatory aggression" on economic issues. See
Greve, Federalism Values, supra note 25, at 362. For discussion of the parameters and content of the doctrine
of preemption more generally, see Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000); and Gardbaum, The
Nature ofPreemption, supra note 22.
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whether coping with new immigrants, guns, health care, social welfare, or
natural resources, local actors live in unbounded worlds.
I do not want to be read as suggesting that this reconfiguration necessarily
produces socially desirable processes or outcomes. To insist on the relevance
of translocal engagement is not to presume its scope or content, nor to assume
that it is fueled, under some pastoral democratic vision, by indigenous activists
aimed at enhancing participatory values. Rather, my view is that bringing
these institutional networks into sight makes problematic some of what has
been extolled as the virtues of federalism.
Specifically, discussions about federalism often posit states as repositories
of the democratic values of accountability and transparency because of the
ability of local actors directly to partake in their own governments. Town hall
meetings still take place and local actors continue to have opportunities for
voice, but those voices may also be carried, via the Internet, around the world.
The input and output of those meetings, like the problems that confront them,
do not match state and city lines. Those open channels may reduce worries
about the capacity to be unduly parochial, given that it is decreasingly possible
to identify issues, lobbying efforts, or solutions that are unique to a single
place. But the translocal efforts also undercut the presumption that localities
are working out individual responses to particular problems such that a rich
diversity of approaches develop.
With the networks of local government officials and private sector actors
thus in view, the metaphors and concerns of federalists need to change. The
literature's focus on the "race to the bottom" presumes interstate effects but
singular state incentive structures. Yet, the evidence of cooperative action
among state actors suggests their increasing awareness of spillover effects that
require coordinated actions. Cooperative work could sound bucolic, but it also
could result in a diminution of diverse responses as well as the kind of
horizontal aggrandizement that shapes some federalist theorists' concerns.245
Moreover, one could conceptualize some of the transjurisdictional
organizations as forms of government that lack accountability and
transparency. But these transjurisdictional networks also provide some
counterweight to the concentration of executive power at the national level. In
short, translocalism-like other jurisdictional arrangements-has potential to
express or do harm to democratic values.
245 See, e.g., Baker, PUlling the Safeguards Back, supra note 19; Baker & Young, supra note 19; Greve,
Cartel Federalism?, supra note 31; Greve, Compacts, Cartels, supra note 34.
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Furthermore, the substance of the policies generated at the local, the
translocal, the national, and the transnational levels do not intrinsically have a
particular point of view on matters of social ordering. My discussion above
focused on what could be termed progressive or liberal policies involving
CEDAW and global warming. I can also use examples in which local action is
aimed at entrenching particular economic or status relationships and in
warding off some of the very changes I have mentioned. In the 1990s, when
CEDAW proponents went to local legislatures, they marched in the footsteps
of anti-foreign activists supporting the amendment that Senator John Bricker
proposed in the 1950s.246 Those groups succeeded in the Texas State Senate in
1954, which passed a resolution petitioning Congress to submit the Bricker
Amendment to the states for ratification.247
Since the 1960s, mobilization by conservative groups has wrought an
impressive transformation.248 As Lisa McGirr has detailed, the "men and
women who rejected the liberal vision and instead championed individual
economic freedom and a staunch social conservativism,,249 have had a
significant impact,250 with recent examples including bans on gay marriages
and legislation to limit access to abortions.251 Comparable positions for and
against various interventions are regularly registered in the United States
Supreme Court. The famous federalism cases-Printz v. United States, Lopez
v. United States, New York v. United States, and United States v. Morrison-
are all instances in which state actors can be found on both sides, either
guarding state prerogatives or supporting national action on issues of gun
I I d . I . 252contro , nuc ear waste management, an VIa ence agamst women.
246 See Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. J and S.J. Res. 43 Before a Subcomm. of the
S. Corron. on the Judiciary, 83d Congo 25--32 (1953) (reproducing letters from local organizations and individuals,
all in support of Bricker).
247 See S. Con. Res. I, 53d Leg., 1st Sess. (Tex. 1954), reprinted in FRANK E. HOLMAN, STORY OF THE
"BRICKER" AMENDMENT 173-76 (1954).
248 See, e.g., SARA DIAMOND, ROADS TO DoMINION: RIGIIT-WING MOVEMENTS AND POLmCAL POWER IN THE
UNITED STATES (1995); LISA McGIRR, SUBURBAN WARRIORS: THE ORIGINS OFTHE NEW AMERICAN RIGIIT (2001).
249 McGIRR, supra note 248, at 12.
250 [d. at 177 (citing Reverend Bob Schuler as expressing a popularly supported view that the United Nations
was symbolic of the "complete destruction of the American way of life and the dethronement of true democratic
freedom").
251 See THOMAS FRANK, WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS?: How CONSERVATIVES WON THE HEART OF
AMERICA 92-101, 192-93 (2004) (discussing the long history of populist movements rife with anti-intellectualism).
Another example comes from state lawmaking to alter federal abortion rights.
252 See Judith Resnik & Joshua Civin, When States Disagree: Discourse, Discord, and Disaggregation in
the Supreme Court's Federalism Jurisprudence (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). For
example, in Printz V. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), eight states' attorneys general came together to file
an amicus brief in support of the petitioner. See Brief for the States of Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana,
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Moreover, these social movements of public and private actors are funded
through public and private channels and have demonstrable effects on
American law. From the school desegregation of Brown v. Board of
Education253 to the banning of certain late-term abortions with no exceptions to
guard a woman's health in Gonzales v. Carhart,254 courts are very much a part
of the "action," as organized "public interest" groups of all kinds engage in
strategic efforts to reshape American law and the composition of the
. d" 255JU lClary.
Turning to the national agendas that I have discussed, in recent years they
have been largely conservative and insistent on executive prerogatives. To
take a few current examples, not only has United States law been resistant to
broadening protections of civil rights, American exportation of law includes
efforts to have other countries adopt legal prohibitions on abortion and to
permit only certain forms of contraception as a predicate to the receipt of aid.
Other efforts include diminishing protections on detainees suspected of
terrorism, toleration of coercion, and broad programs of surveillance.
America's agendas are by no means limited to security, for many efforts are
made to protect certain forms of free-market economic structures.256
Yet, the national identity cannot be assumed to be inevitably committed to
these approaches. Progressives once dominated, shaping the New Deal, the so-
called Third Reconstruction, and the creation of the United Nations.
Furthermore, as sovereigntists such as Justice Scalia frequently comment,
importation of norms from abroad could not only alter but lessen various
Nebraska. South Dakota, Virginia, and Wyoming as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (Nos. 95-1478 & 95-1503), 1996 WL 473580. Another thirteen states joined in an
amicus filing on behalf of the respondent. See Brief for the States of Maryland, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii,
Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, (Nos. 95-1478, 95-1503), 1996
WL 590921.
253 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
254 127 U.S. 1610 (2007).
255 See Robert Post & Reva Seigel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Bacldash, 42 HARv. C.R.-
c.L. L. REv. 373 (2007); see also, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 467 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2006), reh'g en
banc granted and opinion vacated (Jan. 9, 2007).
256 See generally Sleven Teles & Daniel Keeney, Spreading the Word: The Diffusion of American
Conservatism in Europe and Beyond, in GROWING APART? AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE 21ST CENruRY 136, 136-
69 (Jeffrey Kopstein & Sven Steinmo, eds. 2007); Kim Lane Scheppele, The Migration ofAnti-Constitutional
Ideas: The Post 9/11 Globalization of Public Law and the International State of Emergency, in THE
MIGRATION OF CONSTlTtmONAL IDEAS 347, 347-73 (Sujit Choudry ed., 2006).
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protections (his examples include jury trials, double jeopardy, separation of
church and state, and abortion) within America's Bill of Rights.257
In short, institutional voices in a host of jurisdictions, public and private,
can and do shift their tones. The ABA was once run by sovereigntists who
dominated the 1950s hearings on the Bricker Amendment, as they advocated a
constitutional amendment to limit the domestic effects of international law.
Today, the ABA plays a leadership role in promoting transnational efforts to
enhance human rights, including urging the United States to ratify CEDAW.
The National League of Cities, now generating women's global leadership
networks,258 was also the organization that campaigned against federal
regulation of workers' benefits and minimum wages?59 All genres of
jurisdiction offer opportunities for those with the wherewithal and insight to
use them.
What this account has also demonstrated is the fragility of both the content
and the contours of the jurisdictional configurations in which we live.. One last
example provides my conclusion, which comes from a comment made by
California's Governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger, who himself both represents
the role that immigrants play in reshaping America's imagery (home and
abroad) and puts pressure on the constitutional insistence that our presidents be
"native born.,,26o When signing an agreement with Great Britain on global
warming, he demonstrated the interdependencies that span continents and
oceans. The Governor was quoted as describing California as the "modem
equivalent of the ancient city-states of Athens and Sparta.,,261
The fact of that agreement is yet another illustration of the transborder
transactions that are all about us. What subsequently happened to both of the
great cities of Athens and Sparta raises questions about whether one would
want them to be exemplary of one's hopes for the future. But in that grand
rhetorical invocation and the subsequent history of these city-states come
useful reminders of the risks of what I call jurisdictional essentialism. Neither
257 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 623-28 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Sarah H. Cleveland,
Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. lNT'L L. I, 99 (2006) (describing the problem as "rights-diluting").
258 See Brooks, supra note 58; see also John Nichols, Urban Archipelago: Progressive Cities in a Conservative
Sea, NATION, June 20, 2005, at 13, 14 (arguing that cities are central forces for rights expansion).
259 See JONES, supra note 55, at 79.
260 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § I. Another current state governor, also mentioned in relationship to this
limitation, is Governor Jennifer Granholm of Michigan; she was born in Canada.
261 Gar Alperovitz, California Split, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 10,2007, at A15.
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local, translocal, national, transnational, nor global entities are necessarily safe
harbors, enduring forms, or intrinsically generative of democratic iterations.
